The Bush White House seems no longer so cocksure of the rectitude of its Iraq policy, as became apparent when President Bush conceded in his ABC television news interview that the accelerating insurgent onslaught in Iraq could be compared to the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam. The president may (or may not) be aware that this sudden upsurge of North Vietnamese violence, largely unpredicted by US intelligence, proved to be the straw that broke the political back of Washington. It was downhill from there as popular support for the war plummeted, largely due to the increasing number of body bags being flown home. The North Vietnamese intransigence convinced the US military establishment that withdrawal and a hand-over to the woefully inadequate South Vietnamese army was the only option.
Now Bush seems to be thinking “outside the box” in an effort to avoid what would be considered by his own party, and even members of his innermost circle, as “cutting and running”.
The Republican establishment, anxious to have another GOP president in the White House in 2009, is already ahead of the administration on the issue. In this respect, the leaked preliminary findings of the Baker committee, while humiliating to Bush, may be designed to lay the ground for a dramatic policy shift — not to mention a step toward a 2008 Republican victory. And the key to any shift in policy will undoubtedly include Syria.
Baker’s suggestion that Syria and Iran now be involved in trying to stem the violent chaos in Iraq recognizes the pivotal role the former could now play, not simply in Iraq but in the Lebanon and also in a Palestinian settlement. The Republican-led US administration would have to eat crow to work with a country its leadership has accused of sponsoring terrorism, but the diplomatic advantages would clearly outweigh the political embarrassment. Direct links with Tehran are currently not on the cards. Nor is it likely that the Iranian government would welcome them. But Damascus’ long and close relationship with Tehran means that it could play an invaluable role as the middleman in a drive to convince the Iranians to curb the increasingly confrontational activities of the Shiite militias.
Syria has played a long and careful game that may have earned it a high price for its cooperation in helping the Americans unravel the political and security knots into which they have tied themselves and by extension, the Iraqi government. Syria’s demand for the restoration of the Golan Heights, coupled almost inevitably with solid progress toward the creation of a just and lasting Palestinian settlement might at last focus Washington’s mind on the two issues which lay at the heart of regional instability, long before the US Iraqi invasion compounded the danger.
The imponderable is Israel, humiliated by its failure to defeat Hezbollah and wracked by scandal. Can Washington now persuade the ally it has sustained so long with cash and cluster bombs to accept the need for real negotiations and real concessions? This will be an intrinsic part of Syria’s price.
