Zarqawi's death has generated endless stories about him, about the impact it will have on the Iraqi insurgency, on the future of US policy and presence in Iraq and finally the prospects of peace in Iraq. Bringing back peace in Iraq is undoubtedly a tough task. Iraq is now saddled with four realities that militate against peace Iraq and even beyond. One, there is an elaborate apparatus that promotes hate and violence; two, a political environment that is bitterly polarized; three, as of now Iraq has no credible regulatory force and four, US presence reinforces hate and violence. The only way to alter situation is to alter the third and fourth realities that have provoked this current level of hate, violence and political polarization in Iraq.
Iraq's current reality will only alter under the pressure of a counter reality. Nothing less will work. Zarqawi's death is only a minor factor in the problem that we confront. Some historical recall is necessary to underscore this fact. We have not fully grasped what the anti-Soviet Afghan war, the last Cold War, actually initiated in the eighties. The Afghan jihad essentially opted to 'use' the supranational connective consciousness of Muslims who shared a particular worldview, to successfully fight the last Cold War. This particular Muslim worldview had a specific religious and political orientation.
After these groups were recruited to fight the anti-Soviet jihad, their patrons created a weaponized, organizational, political, financial and ideological infrastructure that supported a growing number of politico-religious militant groups. And by extension also helped them crystallize their political beliefs.
In addition to the main patrons of this Cold War, there were other regional governments and intelligence agencies of Libya, Iraq and other states, also facilitating their growth. They used these politico-religious groups as proxies in their respective regional inter-state battles.
These groups that were provided the enabling infrastructure by the US- and Pakistan-led international community's policies in Afghanistan, were operating on two tracks. One that was linked to their patrons. The other track was organizationally and politically autonomous of their patrons. On this track they envisioned their roles far beyond Afghanistan. They were to provide the alternate 'way of being,' for state and society. They were to wage an ideology-driven political battle like ones that had been fought throughout history. What they were exposed to, under US and Pakistani guidance, was the one between nonbeliever Communists versus the believers was what they were exposed to. These groups would naturally draw upon their own core beliefs; the ones that were drawn upon and given a militant, noncompromising and violence-based texture by their patrons. And they had worked. The world had declared that the last Cold War had helped to dismantle the Soviet Union.
Hence the journey of these politico-religious groups continued beyond the Soviet exit from Afghanistan. Some stayed in Afghanistan, other moved to many global corners in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Europe, Middle East, Africa and the US. Their politics found rationale in the policies of the US and as much in the inadequacies of Muslim governments. It drew upon that very political worldview that they were told had worked against the other superpower - the Soviets. These groups still remained potent policy tools for governments who had their own 'national' objectives to promote.
Also among people many within the Muslim world, these groups were the response to the anti-Muslim policies of the United States, to the blundering states in the Muslim world, to an increasingly 'godless' modernity that many saw as a counter to what their own beliefs, to a sense of a combined sense of inadequacy, injustice and anger within millions of Muslims living across the globe. Also the sectarian beliefs that hitherto had stayed restricted to the religious tutor and the student could now be practically implemented.
The weapons, organization, passionate frenzy and suicide bombers were now available to destroy the 'other.'
These groups were onto a bigger stage. The global stage. On to a bigger agenda. They would force the American 'Satan' to redraw its steps in the Muslim world, they would battle for soul of Islam, they would capture the state and implement 'true' Islam, they will impose a global morality based on their belief system, they will help people prepare for the hereafter, they will ensure that Muslim women and men follow their version of Islamic way of being. For some groups who believe in the need to purify Islam, it is imperative to destroy the 'other' residing within the fold of Islam.
And then Washington made Iraq 'happen.' For these groups the US invasion of Iraq meant an instant enhancement of their moral, political and organizational clout. They were handed a vast theater of operation. The invasion of Iraq and the conduct of the US war in Iraq provided fertile ground to these groups. Most of their agendas including destroying of the 'other' existing within the Islamic fold became easy to implement in a country with a history of sectarian problems.
And the atrocities, the acutely abusive behavior of primarily the American soldiers in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan and Abu Ghraib and the stories of an Iraqi version of the massacre at My Lai, for many would justify much of what these groups stand for. Zarqawi had a following. Many ordinary peace-loving Muslim in his home country Jordan believe Zarqawi is a martyr. The disconnect between the reality of Zarqawi and the myth is obvious. But the myth prospers in a given context. The individual is significant only insofar as he or she is drawing upon the context for their survival. Be it physical or mythical. If people feared Zarqawi many supported him too.
All this points to two important facts. One that what in revisiting the trajectory of the creation and functioning of these groups we understand what a daunting phenomenon the past policies of those who are fighting terrorism created. Essentially simple-minded and very driven men from various communities of believing Muslims were converted into militant, armed and hating men with a mission to destroy the 'other' and to assert their own truth. Much else was picked up along the way by these groups, corruption, more hatred, criminal ways, an expanding agenda and tighter organization plus perhaps expanding support too.
The problem is not religion, it is politics. Although in many cases the politics has also influenced the core beliefs and practices of certain Muslim groups. However the issue still is the exposure that these groups got through the Afghan war. Had the Christian right been used in an Afghan-like jihad and then allowed free play within the US territory alongside the US' bordering states, the Christian right's militancy would have been on the rise. Hence this debate on Islam and terrorism is misplaced. It is simplistic. After all where was the so-called nexus between Islam and terrorism, before the international Afghan jihad? Almost nowhere.
The other important fact that flows from this is that where do we go from here? It must be toward greater reason; but not without justice. Security measures alone are inadequate. The response has to be a multilayered one. It has to change the context in which all this is continuing. Zarqawi's departure is only an event that will not dent the reality of terrorism that exists; that flourishes in a given context.
