There is a great deal of difference between Islamic government and Islamist governments. Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state where law is Shariah-based and government is stable and responsible. The former Taleban regime in Afghanistan was an Islamist government — reactionary, xenophobic and with a most narrow view of Islam which was used to oppress its own people and exported abroad through Al-Qaeda and related global terrorist groups. The difference is important in the case of Somalia. Does the group that has taken control of the capital Mogadishu, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), have an Islamist agenda like that of the Taleban, or is it simply intent on bringing a stable, responsible Shariah-based government to the country?
The ICU’s leader Sheikh Sharif Ahmed insists that his team is a force for good with no defined political objectives and that it has no allegiance to terrorism and no intention of imposing a Taleban-style state in Somalia.
He would, of course, say all that if he had a hidden agenda. But he has a reputation as a moderate. His offer to the barely functioning transitional government based in Baidoa and the hated warlords to join him in a new interim government confirms that. Nonetheless, the fear that Somalia might become a safe haven for Al-Qaeda is a genuine one. It is for the ICU to prove itself. Somalia has a history of violence to live down. Furthermore, while Ahmed is a moderate, his two main colleagues are known to be far more radical.
This weeks’ decision by the ICU to prevent Somalis watching the World Cup on TV by closing makeshift cinemas is a self-goal; it could strangle at birth any public sympathy for the ICU. But these notwithstanding, Ahmed and his organization should be given the benefit of the doubt and allowed to prove themselves. To that extent, the emollient stat ement from Washington that not all the ICU’s members are extremists, and its suggestion of an international conference to discuss Somalia, are highly encouraging. Its funding of the warlords has too closely resembled its shameful support for banana republic dictators during the Cold War.
For the moment, the ICU’s writ does not extend beyond the capital and is unlikely to do so without a political breakthrough. There are contacts between it and some members of the transitional government which might result in an agreement to join forces — they have certainly ensured the government’s virtual collapse; but even so it is not going to establish its authority over the whole country without a fight, probably several. The tribal warlords have rejected Ahmed’s olive branch; they will not surrender power voluntarily. Nor is it certain how the ICU will fare in any fresh battle. It did not win power in Mogadishu in a single sweep; it took well over a year and there are still pockets outside the city beyond its control. Its decision not to attack the nearby warlord bastion of Jowhar confirms its lack of strength. The warlords know it and will counterattack. The stage is set for fresh violence. It may be a long haul before the ICU wins, if ever.
