Even after dealing with Afghanistan off and on for about twenty-five years, the United States has not understood that it needs mega investment of capital for economic development, constant presence of security forces for political stability, massive investment for building modern governmental infrastructure and for providing ample financial incentives for the poppy farmers to grow other crops.

However, in the overall context of the US war on terrorism, Afghanistan does not seem to be getting the kind of attention, force presence, and capital that it direly needs.

To top it all, the Indo-Pak rivalry, which was not a variable during the Taleban rule of Afghanistan, is also becoming a noticeable player in that country. It appears that the Taleban are resurging in the southern part of Afghanistan at a time when the United States wants to decrease the size of its troops there, and when NATO’s ISAF (International Security Assistance Forces) is taking over the brunt of activities in Afghanistan.

It has been reported that the Taleban forces in their skirmishes with the NATO forces and with the Afghan Army are showing considerable sophistication.

That sounds like an echo of the past.

The Taleban showed the same type of sophistication when they started smashing the Mujahedeen forces in the 1995 and 1996. As it turned out, that the Pakistani intelligence service — ISI — was actively involved, not only in training the Taleban forces, but also participating in the actual military operations that were then launched by the Taleban.

One should not be surprised by a repeat of that role by the Pakistanis this time as well. The outbreak of riots in Afghanistan on May 29 was an indicator that the Afghan resentment about the presence of foreign troops is on the rise.

The chief reason for that is the haplessness of the government of Hamid Karzai and its seemingly innate inability to expand the circle of legitimacy in the areas far removed from the urban regions of Kabul.

At the same time, the Taleban are reportedly testing the strength of American commitment as the NATO troops are taking over the security-related responsibilities in that country.

The Bush administration is reportedly pulling out 3000 troops this summer. There are talks of even more American withdrawal later.

Taleban are clearly envisioning victory in the making, since their interpretation is that the US has had enough of being in their country.

It does not matter how realistic that impression is. What matters is that very impression is making the Taleban forces bolder than ever before with the passage of each week.

Now the Taleban forces have every intention of targeting the NATO troops. The current US problem is that it wants the ISAF to take whatever military mission the situation requires. However, a number of NATO countries — namely Spain, Holland, Italy and Germany — are not about to fight a full-fledged guerrilla war. Their commitment to Afghanistan is reconstruction, not combat.

Italy under the new Prime Minister Romano Prodi is already busy withdrawing its troops from Iraq. No one knows how committed his government will be about leaving the Italian forces in Afghanistan, especially if they were to become targets of Al-Qaeda and Taleban insurgency. From the perspectives of the Karzai government, there has been no Western presence in three out of four provinces of southern Afghanistan, the heartland of the Taleban.

There are no palpable signs of Western aid aimed at improving the quality of life of the people in those provinces. Such a reality does not necessarily reflect the absence of the will of the West to build Afghanistan; however, in the Afghan streets that is precisely how it is being read. Consequently, the Taleban presence is becoming of high visibility.

It is yet to be seen how committed the ISAF would be in confronting the Taleban, especially as the American troops start to dwindle in that country.

There has not been any noticeable decline in opium trade. Afghanistan still provides about 90 percent of the world’s heroin, which is being thrived under the suzerainty of a number of warlords.

According to a U.N report, “although there was a 21 percent fall in the land devoted to poppy grown in 2005, the yield per hectare rose due to favorable weather, resulting in overall out-dipping just 2.4 percent.” It is well nigh impossible to persuade the farmers not to grow poppy when there is no remotely lucrative alternative crop available. In addition, President Karzai has maintained strong opposition to using aircraft to spray fields with herbicide. He is rightly afraid that the consequence of such drastic measure would only bolster the support of the Taleban in the south.

On top of all these problems, the Indo-Pak rivalry is also resurging in Afghanistan. When Afghanistan was under the Taleban rule, the Indian leaders were having regular nightmares about the onslaught of Islamic “fundamentalism” in Kashmir and inside their regular borders. That was one reason why India became actively involved in giving military and other assistance to the Northern Alliance, which was desperately trying to overthrow the Taleban.

In the post-9/11 era, under the American-backed President Hamid Karzai, India is back in Afghanistan. Now Pakistani leaders are having their own nightmares about India’s “sabotage” through their western borders. The resuscitated Indo-Pak rivalry may be one important reason underlying the heightened activities of the Taleban, and the Pakistanis might be playing a critical role in it.

They are resolute about never allowing a stronghold for India, their archenemy, even if it means pushing Afghanistan to the precipice another civil war. The future of Afghanistan might be up for grabs and the United States may not even know it.

Pakistan is getting angry about India’s growing presence in Afghanistan. Islamabad claims that the Indian agents are using their consulate offices in Kandahar and Jalalabad to worsen the insurgency in the Balochistan province. The Pakistani government accuses the Karzai government of turning a blind eye to such alleged Indian activities.

Karzai, in turn, accuses Pakistan of providing sanctuaries to the Taleban to launch attacks on the Afghan territory.

Both neighbors are also pressuring the Americans to take immediate corrective measures. If the tussle between India and Pakistan on the territory of Afghanistan were to intensify, the loser will be Afghanistan.

Pakistan is an old hand at this game. It has been effectively using Afghanistan for its own strategic advantage since the early 1980s. It has the advantage of common religious affiliation, the shortness of distance between any cities of Pakistan and Afghanistan. While this factor may be of some advantage to alleged Indian saboteurs currently, it is likely to decisively favor Pakistan. What favors Pakistan most is the fact that the American resolve to stay in Afghanistan is not likely to last very long. It is already seeking a heightened participation by the ISAF for the security of Afghanistan.

While Afghanistan’s Western friends will come and go Pakistan will always be there. That reality serves as the chief disadvantage for any Indian aspirations to dominate Afghanistan or cause serious security problems for Pakistan. The overall prognosis for Afghanistan does not appear promising.

As the Untied States remains focused on Iraq and managing the simmering conflict with Iran, Afghanistan seems to be slipping backward.

— Ehsan Ahrari is the CEO of Strategic Paradigms Defense Consultancy based in Alexandria, VA, US. He can be reached at: [email protected] or [email protected]