Pakistan’s Sept. 5 deal with the tribesmen in Northern Waziristan follows an elaborate re-think within the country on how to proceed with its operations in that region.

The over-all realization was that the operation started in 2002 could not claim any success.

The Pakistan Army had not been able to prevent the tribals from supporting the Taleban. In fact a day after the Sept. 5 deal was signed, President Musharraf said in Kabul: “I completely agree that there are Al-Qaeda and Taleban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Certainly they are crossing from Pakistan side and causing bomb blasts and terrorist activity in your country.”

The new deal, through constructive engagement of the sponsors of these groups, hopes to stop cross-border support for the Taleban. Admittedly a tough call.

It is an operation that is politically unpopular across the country. The global gaze is on Pakistan’s tribal areas. Within Washington’s policy circles the immediate step contemplated after any terrorist attack within the US is a military attack on Pakistan’s tribal areas, though Musharraf has warned of a “total uprising” in Waziristan in case US forces entered the area.

Though lack of the operation’s success has been put to less than total commitment by some elements in the Pakistani establishment, the US CENTCOM commander Gen. John Abizaid has given a clean chit to the Pakistan military and government in this respect. He said on Aug. 26 at Bagram: “My experience with the Pakistani military has been that they are committed. My experience with President (Pervez) Musharraf is that he is committed.”

The Sept. 5 agreement is an attempt at achieving success that has eluded the operation. Interestingly the operation has seen a two-year cycle involving new initiatives. For example in June 2002 with heightened US-Pakistan intelligence cooperation, Pakistani officials were confident of nabbing the 500 Al-Qaeda members in the area.

The next peace deal came in April 2004. Under the settlement brokered by the MMA, the jirga publicly undertook not to provide protection to foreign militants; to surrender their heavy arms to the local authorities; and all foreigners to be registered and then given amnesty by the state.

The deal was not implemented. No one surrendered because the tribesmen denied presence of any foreigners.

The Pakistan Army claimed there were 400 “foreign” combatants with links to the Taleban and Al-Qaeda militants hiding in the tribal areas.

The tribal area in fact got radicalized as an innocent tribal tortured for years in Guantanamo Bay, arrived to organize his tribe against his American torturers.

The latest deal is between the government and the 45-member local jirga.

It again banks on the traditional tribal honor to stand by is commitments. Under the agreement, the foreigners living in North Waziristan must leave Pakistan. Those who stay on will be bound to “respect the law of the land and the agreement.” Conceding the local political and security space to the local tribal leadership, the deal shifts the responsibility of peacekeeping to the traditional source of power — the tribal chiefs. The tribal leadership is obliged to prevent cross-border incursions into Afghanistan or attacks against Pakistani law-enforcement personnel or property.

The government has agreed to stop ground and air operations against the tribals. The army will withdraw from the public areas to the cantonments. Soldiers will be withdrawn from border checkpoints replacing them with tribal policemen. As a goodwill gesture, 165 prisoners have been freed and the confiscated weaponry, vehicles and equipment returned.

The deal is also meant to undermine Taleban insurgency inside Afghanistan. Yet it is no magic wand.

Indeed within 48 hours of the signing of the deal, the Taleban struck the bloodiest blow in Kabul killing 18. NATO has lost 21 troops in Kandahar since July.

Significantly the key members of the international team in Afghanistan, the Americans and the British, see reason to support the new deal.

Meanwhile, outside the official circles, there is growing criticism of the deal. Analysts also remain suspicious of Pakistan’s intentions. They claim the deal will “provide safe haven to terrorists”. Gen. Musharraf is being criticized for appeasing the army that was always critical of the Waziristan operation. But the critics of the conciliatory approach the deal represents would have to answer questions such as: Do they want bombing a place into the Stone Age, like in Iraq and Afghanistan? Or go for presumed or real neighborhood sanctuaries, like in Lebanon? Or deploy thousands of lethally armed and APC-protected soldiers as in Afghanistan and Iraq?

The central challenge of our times remains how to wean away people from destructive engagements. There are only two ways. One, constructive engagement with the “other” to encourage them to have a stake in a common future. One example is the way Sudan encouraged the SPLA leadership to begin negotiations. Two, the emergence of an enlightened wave of politics that wins peoples hearts and minds.