The nonaligned summit in Cuba can claim one unintended benefit. Indian Prime Minster Manmohan Singh used the summit meeting with President Musharraf in Havana to retrace his steps. He used the meeting to announce India’s return to the dialogue table.

In July after the ghastly Bombay bombings, Manmohan Singh had relented to internal pressure. After the bombings the opposition and a section of the Indian bureaucracy had demanded that action be taken against Pakistan. In Manmohan Singh’s calculation walking out of the dialogue process was the “least damaging” action he could take. It would also take the pressure off him by externalizing the problem, whipping the ISI and Pakistan and suspending the talks. So he did.

The suspension was half-hearted. The Bombay blasts did not disrupt the back channel negotiations. The foreign secretary-designate, who has also been involved in the Indian back channel team, continued the dialogue in Islamabad.

Neither did it stop bilateral interaction in other areas. For example officials from border security agencies of the two countries met in the last few weeks. Delhi’s July announcement of the suspension of the composite dialogue signaled that the Pakistan-India peace process had fallen prey to Indian politicians and the hard-line bureaucrats. They held Pakistan responsible for the dreadful Bombay attacks. This in turn shaped popular criticism of the Manmohan government’s “soft policy” on terrorism and Pakistan. Hence confronted with clamor to take action even before the investigations could point to the Bombay suspects, Manmohan Singh called off the foreign secretary-level talks scheduled for the end of July. He pointedly charged Pakistan with not reining in Pakistan-based militant groups. He maintained, “Without the support from elements across the border, the terrorists would not have been able to carry out strikes with such effect.” The Indian prime minister’s conclusion was that “the 7/11 blasts are bound to affect relations with Pakistan.... it becomes very difficult to maintain normal relations with that country.”

He opted to not engage with the Pakistani president’s prompt offer to jointly tackle the problem of terrorism. Musharraf had announced, “Whosoever has done this cannot be pardoned at all... I assure Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that the Pakistan government and I myself are with him in any investigation he wants to carry out.”

Musharraf had given an opening for a cooperative engagement between the intelligence outfits of the two countries. Questioning the decision to call off the foreign secretary-level talks, Islamabad reminded Delhi that it was in the interest of both countries to opt for a cooperative approach for resolving the growing and complex threat of terrorism.

It was widely accepted that despite the fact that some groups still used Pakistan as a staging base, Pakistan itself was a victim of terrorism. As India still opted to call off the talks even before the findings of any investigation on the Bombay blasts, Washington publicly stated that there was no evidence to implicate Pakistan in the bombings. There has been a pattern of similar conclusions after the Chattisingpura massacre of Hindu pilgrims and the attack on the Indian Parliament.

And also given the emerging challenge of communalism within India, the new political fault-lines, and the global reach of terrorist groups, the sources of terrorism could likely be internal as well. Yet given the sordid inter-state history of sabotage and subversion, covert operations, battling along the LOC, intelligence operations and militant activity, the finger pointing at Pakistan almost always precedes investigation results. The fact that terrorism has also surfaced within the broader Indian context of the insurgencies in the North East, Kashmir, the Gujarat killings and the Varanasi attacks is almost overlooked. The focus stays on elements like Dawood Ibrahim and Azhar Masood, and the openly avowed anti-Indian objectives of some of the Pakistan-based sectarian groups.

The external dimension extends beyond Pakistan. India’s past haunts it from other directions too. The seeds of cross-border terrorism were sown by India in its support and creation of LTTE and Mukhti Bahini who fought for the separation of East Pakistan. There is also the new internal dimension of the post-Babri Masjid and post-Gujarat radicalization of Muslim opinion in India. That makes sabotage and subversion by neighboring states easy. Indian media suggests that local Kashmiri militant groups plan to step up grenade attacks on local targets. Indian intelligence experts have reportedly warned that Al-Qaeda has been looking at ways of increasing support among India’s Muslims.

But none of this was factored in as the majority media voices asked for action against Pakistan. They had assumed complete Pakistani culpability.

A notable reservation on this theme came from Barkha Dutt of NDTV. In her July 18 website piece, “No Peace for the Wicked”, she wrote: “There’s just one thing I am sure of. The government must be dead sure and have enough evidence before it points a direct finger at Islamabad. We don’t need fake encounters, staged killings, or convoluted leaks by spooks in the IB. Just the facts please...To fall back on easy rhetoric this time would be for the state to play rabble-rouser. And the stakes are simply too high.”

At Havana Manmohan attempted to lead the Indian state away from the role of a rabble-rouser. Musharraf has already taken this much-needed step. At this stage the India question is no longer hostage to domestic politics. At Havana Musharraf and Manmohan decided that the fourth round of the composite dialogue should go ahead.

Most likely the foreign secretaries will meet in November. In their meeting Musharraf and Manmohan again reiterated that resolution of Sir Creek and Siachin be expedited. Earlier this year the near resolution on Siachin, as reportedly in the Indian press, was blocked because of the reservations of the Indian Army. Joint survey of the disputed Sir Creek area has already been approved.

Another issue on which there has been movement is the Baghliar Dam. Later this month Pakistani and Indian officials will get an opportunity to register their responses to the issues raised by the other country. The experts will give their verdict in the final meeting scheduled for November in Washington.

Meanwhile Indian prime minister’s trip to Pakistan has been linked to the resolution of either of these issues. The decision to set up a Joint Working Group on terrorism is important. Such an arrangement pre-supposes a degree of trust between the countries.

As for terrorism, to deal with the factors promoting or facilitating this scourge within and outside, a preliminary working relationship between the two intelligence agencies is essential. This would be required for two specific reasons. One to tackle the elements within each country that may have links or influence groups operating in the other country’s territory. Two, to directly address allegations and “evidence” of agency-supported covert operations in the other’s country — whether in Bombay or Balochistan.

Meanwhile to ensure a thriving South Asia there is only one way forward — the way of peaceful coexistence. Any deviation away from a principled peace which includes a fair resolution of outstanding issues will only complicate the existing problems. It will hinder India’s march toward progress. Continued confrontation will hold down Pakistan too.