The defining factor in the Pakistan-US relationship is how Islamabad tackles the “terrorist threat.” This was yet again underscored at the Musharraf-Bush summit in Washington on Sept. 22.

And the joint press conference following the summit — the opening statements and the questions and answers — all indicated unprecedented trust and confidence between the leaders of the two countries. Significantly this press conference was in sharp contrast to the one held in Islamabad in March this year. Then Bush had talked of ascertaining “checking out” Musharraf’s credentials as a reliable ally in the “war on terrorism.”

In Washington the US president went all-out to praise his Pakistani counterpart. Musharraf in his turn was assertive and confident. He did some plain speaking on the question of trust. Responding to a question Musharraf said, “A relationship is trust and confidence. Now, if we don’t have that trust and confidence in each other, and we think that we are bluffing each other — I don’t think that’s a good way of moving forward...”

Bush categorically dismissed all doubts about Musharraf’s commitment to fighting terrorism and said, “He (Musharraf) understands that we are in a struggle against extremists who will use terror as a weapon.”

The Sept. 22 Bush-Musharraf summit has clearly helped establish unprecedented level of trust between them.

Over the Waziristan deal, the handling of the Taleban threat and tracking the Al-Qaeda, the two capitals are now reading from the same page.

Despite some American reservations about how successful the Waziristan deal would turn out to be, the doubts about Pakistan’s sincerity in wanting to tackle these issues seems to have fizzled away. Bush made this unambiguously clear when he said, “When the president looks me in the eye and says, the tribal deal is intended to reject the Talebanization of the people, and that there won’t be a Taleban and won’t be Al-Qaeda, I believe him, you know.”

There is support for the deal within the US administration but interestingly influential analysts like Steve Cole and Peter Bergen who appeared on CNN to comment on the Musharraf-Bush summit also understand that, given the complexity of Taleban challenge, this deal needs to be given a chance. Musharraf’s return praise was yet another attempted balancing act.

Though he was overly generous in his praise of Bush, he was careful to hint his differences with some of the directions of the US foreign policy. “I trust him (Bush) also that he’s trying to do his best for bringing peace to the world. And I trust him also that he’s trying to resolve the core issue of the Palestinian dispute.”

Washington has huge stakes in the successful handling of the Taleban and by extension the Al-Qaeda factor in the Pakistani tribal areas. In Washington it is seen as one of the pivots on which rests the future of global terrorism. Pakistan’s significance for the US is best stated by Richard Haass, president of the Council of Foreign Relations. “Pakistan poses the most complicated and a difficult long-term foreign policy challenge on the US agenda. They have ... an arsenal of nuclear weapons and are in a position to affect not simply Afghanistan’s future but that of global terrorism.”

This means Pakistan and the US are bound by the doctrine of necessity.

That many of the Al-Qaeda operatives and Taleban have been present in the area does mean that Pakistan will find itself in the eye of the terrorism storm. Of course the political and ideological dimensions of the terrorism threat have to be tackled principally by the United States.

But there still remain many unanswered questions. For example how far will this “war on terror” succeed? Will the Taleban threat that is largely political too fade out as a result of the Waziristan deal? How much can a Pakistan-US partnership achieve against terrorism in an unchanged global political context?

Within the Pakistan-US context seven conclusions can be drawn from the Musharraf-Bush summit. One, Pakistan remains critical to the US “war on terrorism.”

Two, the Americans increasingly see Musharraf as an indispensable ally.

Three, the Americans are finally appreciating the complexity of the challenge in Pakistan and also in Afghanistan.

Four, after the failures in Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan, Americans are hoping to be tutored by Pakistan in successful ways of dealing with conflict and insurgency.

Five, Washington is now views Pakistan as a partner in resolving the situation in Afghanistan. Six, Pakistan seeks to create space for Musharraf’s efforts to use the Pakistan-US nexus to promote Pakistan’s interests.

Seven, American support helps to strengthen Musharraf’s domestic standing in an uncertain political context.