In his memoirs, “In The Line of Fire”, Gen. Musharraf of Pakistan gives his version and interpretation of recent events in his country.

A very easy read, the book has evoked unprecedented global interest. The interest in the book means interest in Pakistan.

The book covers three areas: The person of Musharraf, Pakistan’s domestic story and Pakistan in the global context. The personal account, engaging and frank, opens a window into the making of Musharraf, the individual.

Undoubtedly Musharraf’s prime motivation is Pakistan’s national interests, whatever he understands it to be. His conduct of policy has been bold, reckless and individualistic. As in his early days, he still remains a person who doesn’t believe in being subtle or in the wisdom of the unstated word.

Musharraf has been severely criticized not only for the content but for the very act of writing memoirs while in office. There has also been criticism of his remarks about A. Q. Khan, Iranian and North Korea’s nuclear programs. His disclosures about the government having received money from CIA for captured terrorists or how did he arrive at his decision to side with the US after 9/11 have also come in for a great deal of criticism. It certainly maybe improper, even unbecoming of a head of state to reveal information indicting his country.

However on balance Musharraf’s book makes for effective advocacy of Pakistan’s position on Afghanistan, on India and on the war on terror. It does tell the generally untold story of Pakistan’s contribution to capturing Al-Qaeda men who had also begun targeting Pakistan, apart from turning Pakistan into a hub for planning global terrorist activities.

However the problematic part of the book focuses on the domestic scene. It is candid, combative and controversial. It attacks many, undermines plenty and takes a selective view of events and people. For example the accounts of the 1971 war read like an indictment of Pakistan’s elected Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. He does not acknowledge the achievements of the other civilian prime minister, Nawaz Sharif. By all independent accounts Sharif’s economic development policies were beginning to bear fruit. But the nuclear tests, the mishandling of the foreign exchange accounts and Kargil war all contributed to the economic crisis of the late 1999.

It is a book that however tells the truth about Pakistan’s governing system. With a political system lacking in checks and balances Pakistani rulers can embark on a virtually unaccountable journey in power.

But Musharraf’s account of the domestic scene misses a crucial point. The balance of power within Pakistan’s political construct is heavily tilted in favor of the military. Military dictator Zia ul-Haq exercised his dictatorial powers to include anomalies in the Pakistani legal system like an un-Islamic version of the Hudood Ordinance, separate electorate and the policy of supporting armed militias that promoted sectarianism.

Not unexpectedly Gen. Musharraf’s Kargil account is being vociferously contested from within Pakistan and from India. As one of the supporters of the expanding Kargil adventure, Musharraf cannot be expected to acknowledge the major politico-diplomatic downside of Kargil, just as the official Indian version of Kargil is unlikely to concede that Indian Army had made no major military breakthroughs - a fact that most of the serious Indian media reports had acknowledged at the time of the conflict. It was astute diplomacy that salvaged India from a military disaster. Pakistan, on the other hand, found itself totally isolated on the politico-diplomatic front. Staying on in Kargil, in defiance of the international community and also with no “moral” standing, was no policy option for Pakistan.

The Kargil episode not only reversed a peace process with India that Nawaz Sharif had started, and one that the Musharraf government would later seek to restart, but it also exposed the irresponsibility and brashness of the Pakistani state. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was criticized for his “soft line” on India and the US.

In fact when the army removed the civilian prime minister, one of its first acts was to withdraw the US troops from the Parachinar area of the NWFP. These troops had come to plan the kidnapping of Osama Bin Laden. Nawaz Sharif’s decision to withdraw support for Taleban was also reversed. Hence, despite all its other flaws, the civilian leadership had opted for a strategic course correction on three key fronts: India, terrorism and Afghanistan. But the army establishment was against all this. It had the ability to undermine a civilian prime minister’s decision. It would take an establishment man to reorient these policies. And Musharraf did so, timely and ably.

Other than convincingly advocating the Pakistan case internationally, Musharraf’s memoirs have also made an important contribution to the Pakistani polity. They have triggered a very lively and frank debate on all key issues effecting Pakistan today. There are no holy cows any longer. Even retired generals and ISI men have joined the fray to contest Musharraf’s account of recent events. This means there will be a vigorous debate on Musharraf’s views on democracy and his account of Pakistan’s political history.

Despite all his positive contributions Musharraf remains an unelected leader and he will not be politically accepted within Pakistan. As of now he has made very little inroads into the vote banks of the PPP and PML-N. His option is to either reach out and strike a deal with the mainstream political parties or remove his uniform to enter the political fray himself. A military president is a liability for a Pakistan that requires tremendous bridge building and a healing touch within.