THE extraordinary public disagreement between Sudan’s president and vice president at a ceremony to mark the second anniversary of the ground-breaking peace deal with formerly rebellious elements in the south is a cause for considerable concern. Vice president and leader of the predominantly black south, Salva Kiir, was probably ill-advised to voice his worries over “serious problems” with the peace deal at the ceremony. He was, however, only repeating publicly anxieties which have been expressed privately for some months. President Omar Bashir, obviously taken by surprise, responded angrily. While he admitted that there had been problems disarming local militias who had supported Khartoum during the 21-year civil war, in his turn he criticized how slowly southerners had implemented their side of the agreement to form the present coalition government.
The effect of the public spat has been to replace — with considerable disquiet — the celebration of a visionary peace treaty ending a conflict which cost at least a million-and-a-half lives. The full extent of the problems surfaced last November when several hundred people were killed in fighting in the south at Malakal; the trouble was between former rebels — many of whom are supposed to have become part of the Sudanese Army — and militiamen who were supposed to have been disarmed.
The main issue is an erosion of trust among members of the former rebels of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in the sincerity of the Bashir government and his National Congress Party. A main contributor to the problem has been the continuing conflict in Darfur. The common element to the troubles both there and in the south has been the activities of armed militias which have appeared at times to work hand in hand with regular government forces. Such collusion has been vigorously denied by Khartoum; yet in the final analysis, the Bashir administration has done nothing to rein in the Janjaweed. Thus the failure to disarm up to 40,000 militiamen in the south of the country understandably fires growing suspicion that the July 2005 peace agreement is not going to last. The Bashir administration appears either powerless to intervene or involved in a deplorable conspiracy. Neither conclusion is pleasant. The Sudanese president was rightly praised for his statesmanship in ending the conflict. If, however, it turns out that the peace was merely a temporary expedient in a continuation of the conflict, he will be widely condemned.
The divisions within Sudan’s coalition government come at a time of markedly increased tension in East Africa. The Ethiopian intervention in Somalia, followed by open US involvement, allegedly to attack Al-Qaeda forces, has undermined regional stability and threatens to reopen deadly national rivalries. If the north-south peace in the Sudan breaks down, an even more dangerously volatile situation will be created. Both sides must thus work to heal the rift as quickly as possible and honor their commitments to the peace deal.
