President George W. Bush was sent a clear message when Republicans were routed in the November midterm congressional elections. An anomaly in American politics, the election was a referendum on foreign policy, namely Iraq. Republicans lost control of Congress, despite the Democrats lacking an agenda other than an ill-defined promise of change.
It was expected Democratic congressional leaders would face serious challenges unifying their notoriously divided party. Democrats, long regarded as an inclusive “big tent” party whose ranks include conservatives and socialists alike, seemed content to rule from the center, using the limited tools of oversight to modify, not change, the Bush administration’s foreign policy prerogatives. On Iraq, Democratic leaders hoped to mute demands among liberals to quickly withdraw US forces, cognizant of the fact that the Republicans and perhaps American public would blame the party in the event of wholesale failure in Baghdad. In short, they aimed to keep responsibility for Iraq solely with President Bush.
But once again, the Bush administration’s apparent failure to quell public dissatisfaction or address facts on the ground in Iraq have emboldened Democrats, a party which just two years ago was seen as rudderless and unelectable. The White House’s decision to ignore the Iraq Study Group and opt for a new plan which escalates US military involvement in Iraq has inadvertently unified Democrats and split congressional Republicans. Meanwhile, Bush’s support among the American public has plummeted, with nearly 70 percent of voters registering their disapproval — 66 percent of whom oppose the new Iraq initiative.
In wake of the November election, it appeared President Bush at long last understood there was something seriously wrong with the Iraq policy. Bush’s public flirtation with the Iraq Study Group, coupled with meetings with an array of strategists and promises to consult with Congress, painted a picture of a flexible leader who was looking for answers rather than trying to convince the public that staying the course was the only option. Just a day after the election, Bush sacked embattled Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld — providing a sacrificial lamb that sent a clear signal that change was on the way.
It was never clear what course Bush intended to chart. In the last month, the Bush administration has changed demeanor, personnel, and policy that collectively aim at reversing growing doubts about the situation in Iraq. Last Wednesday’s unveiling of the Iraq stabilization plan was supposed to be the finale of the national security makeover. However, the new Bush plan has generated no more support than the status quo. It has, in fact, emboldened known war critics and motivated those harboring private doubts about it to emerge publicly as opponents.
The Jan. 10 speech was unique in that for the first time since the US invasion, President Bush accepted personal responsibility for mistakes in Iraq. Gone, apparently, were both the smirk and the rose-colored glasses he has long worn, despite 3,000 US military deaths, countless Iraqi casualties, and a state of anarchy if not civil war.
Bush also has reshaped his national security lineup. Robert Gates, a close ally of James Baker and integral member of his father’s foreign policy team, replaced Rumsfeld. Senior statesman John Negroponte shifted positions to become Condoleeza Rice’s top adviser at the State Department. Controversial UN Ambassador John Bolton was replaced by Zalmay Khalilzad, who himself was replaced by veteran diplomat Ryan Crocker as ambassador to Baghdad. Lt. General David Petraeus, who has a Ph.D. from Princeton, was named commander of military forces in Iraq.
But demeanor and personnel alone do not change reality, which is why Bush crafted the new Iraq initiative. Bush’s plan calls for placing 21,500 more US combat troops in Iraq, providing $6.5 billion in funding for military and reconstruction operations, and supposedly requiring benchmarks on the fragile Iraqi government.
While the plan aimed to reverse Bush’s sagging support in Congress, it seems to have hastened it. Not only was it denounced by Democrats across the board, but also by many Republicans, including prospective 2008 presidential candidate Sam Brownback, a staunch conservative. With many notable Republicans defections, Democratic leaders now seem eager to confront the White House on Iraq. Embracing the Iraq Study Group, enjoying a rare period of intra-party unity, and with amble public support, Democrats are positioning themselves not only to conduct vigorous oversight of the war’s handling, but perhaps use their budgetary authority to block future military operations and force troop reductions. The Bush plan has given Democrats the political cover they need not only to question the current Iraq policy, but change it — an agenda which is both clear and popular.
One possible casualty of the new Bush plan could be the presidential prospects of Sen. John McCain, a maverick Republican who enjoys considerable support among moderate and independent voters who are key to winning the 2008 presidential race. Because McCain supports increasing the number of US troops in Iraq — indeed beyond the numbers proposed by Bush — the “surge” option has already been dubbed the “McCain Doctrine.” If the surge plan fails, it not only will further weaken Bush, but could fatally damage McCain, the Republican’s top 2008 presidential contender.
— David Dumke is principal of the Washington-based MidAmr Group. E-mail: [email protected].
