While it is a matter of conjecture that the Middle East, with the most amount of energy resources, is now also the theater of utmost uncertainty in the security realm, the effort to strike a new Russia-Gulf chord, however, is a deliberate design.
While commercial interests lie at the heart of Russia’s renewed interest in the Gulf, two strategic factors guide its approach to the region. First, Russia’s slow but sure re-emergence as a great power makes it necessary for Moscow to showcase its clout, especially after the ouster of Saddam Hussein in Iraq; and second, the concern that the Middle East security scenario and its spin-off could hurt the Caucasus and Central Asia, and perhaps Russia too.
Putin’s tour of Saudi Arabia and Qatar (as well as Jordan) is the first in the history of diplomatic links between Russia and the Gulf region. Old rivals Moscow and the Gulf countries have found a common agenda that spans oil, terrorism, and arms sales.
The altered focus takes place in a milieu where the Gulf countries are signaling their keenness to keep all geopolitical options open, reviewing the utility of the United States as the sole security guarantor, and contemplating a collective security mechanism that involves a host of international players.
In the economic realm, the Gulf countries recognize that Russia, as the largest producer of oil outside the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the largest producer of natural gas, holds sway over the global energy markets. Riyadh wants its own “energy dialogue” with Moscow, which has been facilitated in some way through the five-year oil-and-gas cooperation agreement signed during the landmark visit of then Crown Prince Abdullah in 2003.
The formation of an “OPEC for Gas” may be discussed with Qatar, the world’s third-largest natural gas producer after Russia and Iran, though Moscow has been noncommittal about such a global cartel, which is also on Tehran’s agenda. Linked to the buoyant energy business on both sides are opportunities to intensify economic cooperation. Russian energy companies are aiming for joint ventures in the region, including Saudi Arabia, while Saudis could invest in the Russian natural resources sector, real estate and aerospace. Riyadh is also an ideal partner under the approximately $25 billion “gas initiative” discussed in 2003, which includes power generation, liquid natural gas export amenities, and seawater desalination. In the political arena, Moscow has immense scope to resolve simmering conflicts in the Middle East, especially in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon, as well as the Palestinian territories by virtue of being a member of the Quartet and having closer ties with Hamas than most of the international community.
On Iran, there have been intense diplomatic efforts between both sides in the recent past, particularly after the increased US naval presence in the region heightened tension. While the Gulf countries undoubtedly resist Iran’s nuclear foray, they also fear that any US military misadventure would wreak further havoc in the region. In this context, just as Russia can use its influence with Iran to insist on containing the nuclear program, it can also use its influence in the UN Security Council to block any unwarranted action. Both sides must use this opportunity to insist on “sensible” policies from the US and Iran.
Russia’s ties with Iran are extremely relevant at this juncture. While the estimated $800 million Bushehr nuclear power plant is being developed as part of a technical agreement with Moscow, there are plans to build and supply another two — possibly five — nuclear reactors, including a second one at Bushehr. In 2005, permanent members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes Russia, granted Iran “observer” status. Further, Russia delivered Tor-M1 air defense missile systems to Iran in December 2006 under an estimated $700 million contract signed a year earlier.
It is in the interest of the Gulf, Middle East and world at large that until Iran comes clean about its real intentions, all those supplying it with arms and extending nuclear cooperation must cease to do so.
However, by involving itself with the Iranian nuclear issue as an “honest broker”, Russia could also help the scenario in Iraq, where Iran’s influence in the internal politics of the war-torn country is increasing every day. Apart from economic interests, it is in this context that Putin is also visiting Jordan.
Discussions surrounding regional stabilization plans are also likely to touch upon anti-terror cooperation in the face of common threats and challenges. While the Gulf countries have been largely successful in controlling the threat posed by extremists and militants, Moscow is still hotly pursuing Chechen rebels, who have had sympathizers and supporters in the Gulf.
— Abdulaziz Sager is the chairman of the Gulf Research Center in Dubai.
