US Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ visit to Pakistan indicates the growing concern among the Western coalition forces about the worsening situation in Afghanistan. The insurgency in Afghanistan has recently shown its bloodiest face since the Taleban’s ouster in 2001 and represents a ticking time bomb today for the collapse of US policies in Afghanistan. The fallout of the US policies in Iraq has been felt across the region, especially in Afghanistan where the Taleban has launched a series of successful offensives against the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

The fact remains that the Afghan case is a test for NATO’s credibility. With a 35,000-strong force currently deployed in Afghanistan, the ISAF is attempting to pre-empt a strong Taleban offensive in the coming spring months. Gates’ visit to Pakistan will be followed by that of NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in the coming weeks. While the NATO top command acknowledges the difficulties and is engaged in coordinating its strategy with neighboring Pakistan, there is a need to review the current policies being pursued in Afghanistan.

Gates has admitted that the United States made a mistake in neglecting Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal. That eventually led to the growth of extremism and resulted in the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. The monumental mistake the US made was that it did not capitalize on the tremendous goodwill the various jihadist groups in Afghanistan had at the time for the West and the US and implement a massive economic reconstruction program; rather the warring factions were left to fight among themselves and consolidate their individual power base, the whole purpose being for them to exhaust their weapons and arms supplies.

The United States is currently making a bigger mistake by helping the Taleban to grow into a nationalist liberating force by supporting a government in Kabul dominated by a minority of the so-called Northern Alliance. Despite President Hamid Karzai being a Pashtun, the Pashtuns have been thoroughly sidelined in the government. It is also felt that the reconstruction has not progressed in an effective manner because of the ineffectual rule of the central government. The US needs to redress the imbalance that has shaped the strategic dynamics within the Afghan political scenario. By alienating the Pashtuns, the US has committed a grave error; the Pashtuns are known for their determination and strength in repelling any perceived foreign occupying force. The majority of the Afghans, particularly the Pashtuns, perceive the presence of the Western forces as they did during the Soviet occupation — as an occupying force and not as liberators. This alienation resulted in the Pashtuns lending indirect support to the Taleban because it is in the forefront of the resistance against Western forces and the Afghan government backed by them.

The immediate measures that the United States needs to implement are:

1) To differentiate between the hard-line Taleban elements with possible links to Al-Qaeda and the majority of the Pashtuns who are fighting a genuine resistance war, but who may be supporting the Taleban as part of the need to forge alliances against the foreign forces.

2) Review and restructure the major social reforms in accordance with their own views in order to not incur the animosity of the traditional Pashtun society; the more they try and enforce their agenda, the more it pushes the people toward the Taleban.

3) Further, the Pashtuns need to be dealt in an even-handed way in the power-sharing arrangements in the government and not be subjected to isolation and/or persecution. This could be done according to the traditional Pashtun nikat system (where power is shared according to the proportion of tribes and subtribes) that worked well in the pre-Soviet times.

4) The lack of strong institutions and an effective central government, rampant corruption, large-scale narcotics production that in turn perpetuates the vicious cycle and is fuelling the insurgency, and most of all, the absence of a strong military, are Afghanistan’s biggest problems. The establishment of a strong military is possible only with a strong government; the willing recruitment of people can only come about if the people feel that they represent a proper Afghan government and not a weak regime whose very viability depends on foreign forces.

5) It is imperative that for any strategic policy to succeed in Afghanistan, the understanding and working within the tribal system is significant.

6) Another extremely important measure would be to rehabilitate the three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan on an immediate basis in Afghanistan. Pakistan cannot and should not be expected to shoulder this responsibility alone.

During Gates’ visit, President Pervez Musharraf reiterated Pakistan’s commitment to the cause but sought help in coordinating and drawing a broader strategic framework whereby joint collective efforts need to be put in not just by Pakistan but also the Afghan government, the US forces and the ISAF troops. Pakistan’s role is crucial in the rebuilding of Afghanistan. There have been accusations that certain elements within Pakistan are abetting the Taleban and providing a haven and resources to it. But it is a fact that Pakistan has lost more then 700 soldiers and officers fighting the Taleban and Al-Qaeda in the border areas of Afghanistan. The Waziristan tribal deal in September 2006 was important because it accorded responsibility to the tribals to safeguard their interests as well as that of the country and included monitoring all alien movements.

In the face of constant criticism by the Afghan government, Pakistan has proposed mining and fencing its entire 1,400-mile-long border with Afghanistan. However, after objections, Pakistan has decided to go for selective fencing to improve cross-border monitoring of Taleban and the Al-Qaeda. Musharraf recently admitted that due to the difficulties that the Pakistan security forces are facing in policing the border, it might be possible that the Taleban is taking advantage. Though Pakistan has established 980 security posts and deployed over 80,000 troops on its border with Afghanistan, it cannot take on the responsibility of ensuring that no cross-border violations take place.

Lastly, the fallout of the US policies in Iraq has had a ripple effect across the region, with some conflict tactics being adopted in Afghanistan. For one, the US policy has resulted in inciting a tribal conflict that has played into the hands of Al-Qaeda. Second, Afghanistan, and increasingly Pakistan, is becoming a target of suicide attacks, a phenomenon unheard of even during the Soviet invasion. The use of Improvised Explosive Devices is also a new development. The growth of these tactics is largely due to its effectiveness.

Whether it is done on the basis of religion, tribal honor, or is born out of desperation and extreme poverty, the society has become so radical that the commanders of the insurgency seem to find enough persons ready to carry out increasingly successful suicide attacks.

The US and ISAF forces’ path in Afghanistan is fraught with the danger of being caught in a deeper quagmire unless the policies and strategy being pursued now are collectively reviewed. There is a need to disengage in a way that does not alienate the Pashtuns, but rather integrates them in a centralized system that is self-sustaining and does not have to depend on the supporting role of the Western forces. Further, the Western powers need to address the issue of creating a strong central government in Afghanistan and implementing a collective security mechanism with the cooperation of the Pakistani and Afghan governments to fight the Taleban and other terrorist elements.

— Faryal Leghari is a researcher in the Security and Terrorism Program at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai.