CYNICS might say that the seriousness behind the EU’s restarting accession talks with Turkey, stalled since last June, may be gauged by its timing. Brussels announced the restart with just under a month to go before the French presidential election. This almost guarantees the issue of Turkish membership being brought into the campaign, with all three contenders likely to vie with each other to deplore it.
Ankara has just withdrawn extensive over-flight rights granted to France in response to the French Assembly’s law criminalizing claims that the Armenian genocide did not take place. Damning the very idea of Turkish EU membership is therefore likely to be very popular with many white French voters. Meanwhile Turkey itself is still smarting from what is seen as a deliberate snub by Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany that currently holds the EU presidency. No Turks were invited to take part in the EU’s 50th birthday celebrations. This was despite Turkey’s long associate membership of the EU and the fundamental contribution of Turkish guest workers to strong German economic growth during the final decades of the last century. Turkish politicians are also looking at their own general election in November and thinking about how to handle the EU issue. There is considerable popular frustration with the way Turkey has been treated by Brussels. Voters now understandably wonder if the ambition is really worth the insults and racist rhetoric Turkey’s application has stirred up.
There is little appreciation that Turkey has in part been responsible for its EU problems. The catastrophic handling of the Cyprus issue by successive Turkish governments played into the hands of its detractors within the EU. When Turkish Cypriots finally got the chance to vote affirmatively on reunification, the once-receptive mood in the Greek part of the island had passed. Already on the threshold of EU membership in their own right, Greek Cypriots rejected the move. The Turkish response was to refuse to open its ports to Greek shipping, a key requirement of the EU accession process.
The problem is that Turkey has no other obvious option than the EU. Its plans to put itself firmly at the head of an economic bloc of the Turkic Republics of the former Soviet Union have come to naught. It remains at odds with its Iraqi and Syrian neighbors, in large part because of their significant Kurdish populations and their perceived role in the restart of the PKK independence campaign within Turkey. Relations with Iran are cordial but other than trade, the countries have little in common.
In the long-term, there is only the EU. But maybe not yet. The EU currently has too many internal tensions to sort out — ranging from its constitution to its currency and economic harmonization — to cope with a huge and underdeveloped new member. Turkey can probably afford delay. From Atatürk to Özal, it plowed an independent economic course. Its markets are now liberalized, its economy is strengthening. With continued political and economic stability, it can prosper and wait until the EU finally realizes that it actually needs Turkey within its borders.
