There is no shortage of explanations being offered for France’s remarkable decision to establish a naval base in the UAE in a deal signed last week. Those who see the project as a threat to stability in the Gulf also think that the French presence will be an extension of American power, because ever since Tony Blair’s departure, President Nicolas Sarkozy has become George W Bush’s new best friend. Others, by contrast, welcome the fact that there is going to be an alternative military presence in the Gulf.
Sarkozy’s first months in power have, if nothing else, demonstrated that this is a very different French president from any of his recent predecessors. Just as he is prepared to mend fences and end a long-standing rivalry with the Americans, so it seems Sarkozy is prepared in foreign policy terms to think in unconventional terms. Paris’ abortive mediation in the Lebanon may have ended on a jarring colonialist note when in frustration French diplomats turned on Syria. But it is also clear that there was a great deal of careful analysis, to say nothing of behind-the-scenes talks between the UAE and Paris, before the French went ahead.
France’s Foreign Office probably still has more Arabists than its British counterpart and certainly knows and understands far more about the Arab world than the State Department in Washington. France’s historical and dynamic interest in the Middle East should not be forgotten. It has also quietly built up strong commercial links in the region, which have included extensive arms sales. Now along with the UAE naval base and a military cooperation deal, the French will also be building two nuclear reactors there. That France will maintain control of the nuclear fuel throughout and after the power generation cycle, suggests that there may be a tactical link between the naval base and the power plants.
Yet even if France is pursuing a diplomatic line in the Gulf that is largely independent of the Americans, on the matter of Iran and its own nuclear program, Sarkozy has been hard-line, toeing the US policy of calling for tougher UN sanctions until Tehran reveals everything it is obliged to under international law about its nuclear program. If the crisis still simmers when their warships first berth in the new base, the French will have placed themselves in the front line with Iran right across a narrow and heavily trafficked waterway.
Yet being closer to the problem may also encourage Sarkozy more toward negotiation. His successful tour of the region virtually hours before the US presidential cavalcade swept in, will have given him the same important message that the Gulf states do not want confrontation with Iran. As an intelligent and thoughtful man, the French president will have reflected on local concerns. Despite his firm insistence that Iran honor its international treaty obligations to the IAEA, Sarkozy is too sensible a politician to imagine he could achieve anything positive by flourishing a saber at the Iranians from across the Gulf.
