They did it. Contrary to expectations, they did it. Not the Kosovars who declared independence from Serbia on Sunday, but the European Union.
Faced with Kosovo’s long-expected move, the 27 EU countries largely stuck together, more or less agreed on a line to take, and have now begun the orderly deployment of a new ESDP mission. Unlike the flag-waving Kosovars or the stone-hurling Serbs, most Europeans shrugged off the news and went about their business as normal. But this week’s events may prove as significant as Kosovo’s redrawing of the European map.
Think-tankers are quick to criticize the EU’s mistakes, limited capabilities and policy divisions. Frankly, the EU makes it easy. Its military mission in Chad was temporarily put on hold because of a shortage of helicopters and troops.
It has now been postponed again because of renewed fighting in N’djamena. In Kabul, the EU’s police mission has been criticized for being slow to deploy, underequipped and poorly resourced. In the Middle East, despite spending billions to support the Palestinians, the EU plays only a marginal role in the US-led peace talks. And over Iran’s nuclear program, the EU has struggled to keep together.
Shortcomings like these look all the more obvious when compared to the rhetoric used by most European leaders and the high-sounding language of the Lisbon Treaty. More often than not, the notion of a “common” EU foreign policy stands against observable reality.
But analysts should give credit when the EU succeeds, and it would appear that the EU has cleared an important hurdle. Toward the end of 2007, Europeans pulled themselves together and settled on a strategy for Kosovo after three years of dithering. As Elizabeth Pond, a Balkan analyst, says, “partly to atone for Europe’s failure to stop the Srebrenica massacre in the 1990s, partly to fill the Balkan policy vacuum at a time when Washington was focused on Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and China”, the EU took the lead.
With negotiations led by veteran German diplomat Wolfgang Ischinger, and the UK and Germany pushing the bloc, the EU decided that the plan proposed by former Finish President Maarti Ahtisaari was the only way forward. The alternative — including a Taiwan-style limbo for Kosovo — could again destabilize the Balkans and rekindle ethnic violence.
When the Serb-Kosovar talks broke down on Dec. 10, EU foreign ministers authorized EU foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, to prepare an EU mission to take up duties in Kosovo as soon as the new government in Pristina declared independence.
True, once Kosovo declared independence, a number of European countries — Spain, Cyprus and Romania — were quick to say they would not recognize the new country. The press jumped on this as a sign of European disunity. But it was always going to be the case that some countries, mainly for domestic reasons, would be reluctant to recognize Kosovo.
What mattered was whether EU foreign ministers could agree on a statement — which they did — and whether the naysayers would block the EU from deploying the EU mission, a de facto recognition of Kosovo’s new status. With nobody obstructing, the mission has begun deploying and will expect to take over completely from the UN in the middle of the year.
The EU’s newfound independence is, of course, not the same as autarchy. The EU’s diplomacy over Kosovo was closely coordinated with the US and NATO. As the negotiations took place, there were times when the US had to push Europe. In the run-up to Kosovo’s recognition, the US pushed hard against those EU countries — including France — who wanted to wait until later in March to recognize the new country. In future, the US is likely to play a similar role. But after years of trans-Atlantic conflict, the cooperation seen is a welcome departure and should perhaps serve as a model for dealing with other foreign policy crises, such as Iran, when a new US president is elected.
With independence comes responsibility. Having helped to give birth to Kosovo, “the EU will bear the greatest share of responsibility” for the country, as Nicholas Burns, a senior US diplomat, said on Monday. This is no mean feat. Kosovo’s economic situation is dire (it will depend on EU handouts), rife with crime and simmering with ethnic tensions.
For the foreseeable future an independent Kosovo will probably also mean a radicalized Serbia. In the recent presidential elections, pro-Western Boris Tadic bested Miroslav Nikolic, the Serb radical leader, but only by a small margin. If parliamentary elections are held, it is not unlikely that Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica will strike a deal with the radical party and find his way back to power. The EU, which has made a mess of things through its blatant interventions in Serbia’s electoral process, is struggling to find a new strategy.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, where European foreign policy had its first fateful outing in the late 1990s, a 12-year internationally run democratization has been under way. But instead of creating a new workable state, the country’s three communities — Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks — have drifted further away from each other. The Bosnian economy is in tatters — with at least 60 percent unemployment — and the billions of EU aid spent have produced little sustainable development.
Finally, while the EU may have shown diplomatic legerdemain over Kosovo, away from the Balkans questions linger about Europe’s willingness to engage in combat-intense military operations. The US defense secretary recently complained about Europe’s lack of support for NATO’s Afghan mission.
But despite all that, Europe has been more successful over Kosovo than anyone could have imagined. While constantly portrayed as failing, the gray-suited EU envoys led the negotiations, turned Russian and Serbian opposition to their advantage, forced the Kosovars to agree conditional independence as well as new guarantees for minorities, and held most of the EU members together. Compared to recent years of division — especially over Kosovo — this is a declaration of independence which deserves recognition.
