The words “significant” and “of no consequence” would seem to be directly opposed to each other. Yet it was in those terms that the Chinese and Americans respectively described yesterday’s six power talks in Singapore on North Korea’s nuclear disarmament. For the first time, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met and shook hands with her opposite number from Pyongyang, Pak Ui-chu at the talks.
The disparity in comments actually encapsulates the markedly different ways in which Beijing and Washington have tackled the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea. On the face of it, the Chinese as North Korea’s direct neighbor have more to fear from its weaponry than the Americans. Yet the Americans have behaved as if the threat were directly against them. Post-9/11, Bush linked North Korea to Iraq and Iran as the “Axis of Evil”. The country was blacklisted as a state sponsor of terrorism. Washington stuck to this characterization of Pyongyang, even after the world saw clearly that one of the other members of the alleged axis — Iraq — had neither WMD nor was it a sponsor of Al-Qaeda. Washington may have chosen belligerence because of its treaty commitments to defend Seoul if it were again attacked from the north. Yet such an assault from a bankrupt North Korea has never looked likely unless, as in the Korean War of 1950-53, Pyongyang was again sustained by China.
The contrast between quiet and dogged Chinese diplomacy and the loud menacing noises coming from the Bush White House is striking. It seems possible that both governments will be convinced that it is their approach that has brought the North Koreans this far. The reality is more likely that the Kim regime in Pyongyang has responded by turns to both the respective stick and the carrot approaches. Some might speculate that there has been far greater correspondence over this between Beijing and Washington than has ever been apparent. In normal circumstances, it might be easy to believe that the two foreign ministries were in collaboration. The truth is, however, that nothing about the Bush administration suggests that it has either the subtlety or the wisdom to participate in such a maneuver. The only possibility is that the small but influential cadre of Sinologists in the State Department may have kept open quiet “channels” to Beijing that have enabled them to leverage their president’s blustering. The Russians, who with the Japanese and South Koreans, make up the six parties to the negotiations chaired by China, may perhaps be watching both the Chinese and American performances with interest. If Iran does actually have a nuclear weapons program, then Russia’s geographical and political position will be very similar in some ways to that of China and North Korea over the last five years. A further common denominator is likely to be a belligerent Washington seeking always to drive the process even when coaxing is more appropriate. A McCain White House is likely to be more uncompromising than an Obama one.
North Korea’s disarmament is far from a done deal but despite Condoleezza Rice’s assertions, yesterday’s meeting was a further step and every such step, however small, is significant.
