In just nine days time, Russian troops are due to withdraw into South Ossetia and Abkhazia from the “buffer zones” they have established around these two Georgian territories, which Moscow has recognized as independent statelets and in which it plans to keep a force of 7,600 troops. The pullout is part of the cease-fire deal brokered by current EU president, French leader Nicolas Sarkozy, which also includes the deployment of unarmed EU peace monitors.
These monitors were always scheduled to move into the buffer zone yesterday but right up until the last minute, there was considerable doubt that the Russian military would allow the EU personnel to pass through their checkpoints to carry out their duties. While Moscow was assuring Brussels everything was arranged, local Russian commanders were warning the EU mission would not be allowed to deploy. In the event, when the monitors reached the checkpoints some parties were allowed entry while others were not. The latter were told that they could not proceed because of security concerns.
This is a classic and very Russian maneuver of contradiction and obfuscation. The effect has been to engender concerns of crisis and then defuse them, even though the Russians have managed to avoid part of their commitment by blocking some of the EU monitors. The Kremlin — and it can be certain that local commanders have not been acting on their own initiative — has also cast doubt over the possibility that its soldiers will, in fact, pull out of the buffer zones on Oct. 10, as agreed. At the very least, there may be delays, perhaps for “technical” reasons or even “security” concerns, though it must be wondered how the might of the Russian Army has been unable to fully secure an area little more than four miles deep.
What this is really all about, of course, is the Kremlin’s desire to continue to assert its power and influence in its own backyard. It is not about technical or security problems and certainly has nothing to do with the principle of self-determination for breakaway states, otherwise Moscow would not have objected so angrily to the cession of Kosovo from Serbia and would be admitting the independence aspirations of the Chechens. There is also a wider canvas. Because of the failure of its free market reforms, Russia has not become an economic power, save in energy supplies. Russian capital and business has not, therefore, been able to assume a significant role in any of its neighbors. The only power and influence it can deploy is military. It needs to cause states along its border to really fear some sort of invasion if they go too far against the Kremlin’s wishes. A Ukraine, bent upon NATO membership and throwing the Russian Navy out of its Crimean base can expect with some certainty Russian interference, even perhaps to the extent of having the ethnic Russian east of the country break away.
