PRESIDENT Barack Obama is soon expected to make a final decision on whether to approve a civilian “surge” of hundreds of additional US officials for the war in Afghanistan. This new strategy would narrowly focus on development, rule-of-law issues and combating the narcotics trade.What the coalition does need, yet unfortunately still lacks, is a clearly stated objective of what they hope to achieve in Afghanistan.
Bringing stability is an obvious goal in the short term. But the long-term prospect of defeating the Taleban and rebuilding the country is an issue that needs to be addressed, yet is seldom raised.
Only months after the initial invasion of Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance and a very small number of US special forces achieved their original goal. The Taleban was ousted from power and Al-Qaeda lost its sanctuary. Nevertheless, the Bonn Agreement of December 2001 — which called for a commission to reconstitute the country’s judicial system in accordance with its 1964 constitution — put Washington on a perilous course of building infrastructure, establishing a rule of law and engaging in counternarcotics.
These more ambitious and less achievable goals diverted attention from ensuring the Taleban would not come back to power, and provided the group the opportunity to stage their comeback. Since 2007 and steadily through 2008, improvised explosive devices, suicide bombs and roadside ambushes have increased across the country, particularly in the Pashtun-dominated east and south. In Logar province — a Taleban and Haqqani network stronghold just south of the capital, Kabul — militants have created a parallel judiciary.
Afghanistan under the tutelage of the Taleban was the clearest case of a foreign threat emanating from a categorical failed state. Its leaders provided shelter to the Al-Qaeda organization directly responsible for the 9/11 attacks. What is less clear is why waging a war against today’s Taleban advances US national security and whether pouring in billions of taxpayer dollars for years to come, given the global financial crisis, is what’s best for the citizens of the US and NATO countries. Throughout its long and turbulent history, the country has looked more like a tribal confederacy than a cohesive nation-state. The situation is exacerbated by low literacy levels and poor-to-nonexistent infrastructure.
At least on foreign policy, President Obama sees himself as a pragmatist, as someone prepared to listen to ideas from anybody and willing to consider anything he thinks might work.
Therefore, rather than “surge” into this volatile region, the president should consider the strategic and political significance of Afghanistan’s surrounding neighbors and engage in regional efforts to broker dialogue among Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, Pakistan and the members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and, most important, Russia.
In the weeks leading up to this April’s NATO summit meeting, the Obama administration must make some tough choices in potential direct talks with the Taleban. Is NATO ready to let them share power if they agree not to shelter Al-Qaeda? What if some elements want to keep their fringe beliefs and draconian practices?
Bringing stability to Afghanistan, especially on the local and provincial levels, is an obvious goal in the short term. But from a wider strategic and economic perspective, no tangible gains will outweigh the risky and costly strategy of a prolonged military presence in this dangerous part of the world.
