For a country facing an existential threat from extremist groups within its borders, Pakistan has an army peculiarly ill-suited to counterinsurgency.
Until recently, up to 80 percent of Pakistan’s forces had been facing east toward India rather than west, the source of its internal challenge from the Taleban.
Those troops deployed in the tribal areas along the Afghan border and now in the Swat Valley have relied heavily on conventional arms, artillery and airstrikes in particular, to assault Taleban strongholds, which are often located in populated areas. The consequent civilian casualties have enraged local communities, boosting Taleban recruitment and inflaming public opinion in mainstream Pakistan.
The more forces poured into battle, the stronger the insurgency has become. The vicious cycle has been accelerated by a chronic lack of development aid in the troubled regions.
Swat, the army says, will be different. It halted air attacks today to allow townspeople to flee. But with increasing reports of heavy collateral damage, it remains an open question.
Since the fall of Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan and the end of the Bush administration in the US, American-backed efforts to reform the hidebound forces have intensified. About 70 American and 20 British military advisers have been deployed to impart counterinsurgency skills to Pakistan’s 85,000-strong Frontiers Corps, a Pashtun paramilitary force deployed along the Afghan border.
However, the main operation in Swat is being led by the regular army, which has historically been the most resistant to reform.
“The army’s performance from 2003 to 2007 has certainly been poor, and we’ll have to see if it has improved in the past year or so. So far, it is very hard to say,” said Hasan Askari Rizvi, a political scientist and commentator. Talat Masood, a retired lieutenant general and former secretary of defense production, said: “The army this time is far more determined and showing far greater resolve. It’s showing much greater understanding of the magnitude of the threat and has a greater level of coordination and is better equipped in going about the operation.”
US military officials have been more pessimistic, complaining privately about their Pakistani counterparts’ resistance to change.
The armed forces’ preoccupation with India is rooted in history. They were created during Partition and have since fought three major wars with India. The Indian threat has been seen as existential far longer than the Taleban, particularly since India conducted its first nuclear weapon test in 1974.
The generals’ aim of waging asymmetric war against India, especially since the military rule of President Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, is also at the root of the army’s links with extremist groups. They were originally conceived as a cheap and effective way of keeping the Indian army pinned down and ensuring a strategic buffer to the west.
Those longstanding ties help explain why Pakistan’s generals have been slow to recognize the seriousness of the challenge from the Pakistani Taleban. Until recently, they tended to see the militants as little more than restive allies.
The $12 billion the US has given Pakistan since Sept. 11 2001 has largely served to entrench the status quo. Little of the aid was properly audited.
The aim now is to use aid as leverage to bolster Pakistan’s defenses against the enemy within. But it is far from clear that reform will come in time to contain the threat. The campaign in Swat will be a critical indicator. “There are greater chances of its success but this is going to be bloody and messy,” Gen Masood said. “ There will be a lot of fallout from this war.”
