In dismissing Gen. David McKiernan, the top US and NATO commander in Afghanistan, and replacing him with Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, a former Joint Special Operations Command chief, President Barack Obama has tipped the balance dramatically in favor of counterinsurgency tactics, as violence there reaches the highest levels since the war began in 2001. But promoting a military leader based on successful operations in Iraq and shifting him to Afghanistan is indicative of the Obama administration predicating its new Afghanistan strategy in part on a rosy scenario in Iraq. But in doing so, Obama may be repeating the same mistake as his predecessor, George Bush.
Obama’s pledge to drawn down US troop levels in Iraq and nearly double the US presence in Afghanistan owes much to one key, albeit fragile, assumption: That the US will leave Iraq a secure and friendly ally. That is the same kind of excessive optimism that got Bush mired in Mesopotamia for a conflict that has proved far more costly, drawn-out and damaging to America’s reputation than he had bargained.
As Obama was reminded during his unannounced visit to Iraq in early April — which came just one day after a series of bombings killed 37 people in Baghdad — the country’s sectarian tensions are far from over. Debilitating problems continue to plague Iraqi society, economy and politics, from power wrangling in the wake of provincial elections, to difficulties in boosting security forces and tensions between the Shiite-majority government and Sunni tribal leaders who turned against Al-Qaeda.
As president, Obama has been careful to avoid repeating Bush’s promise of victory in Iraq. Transferring full authority to the Iraqis also allows the Americans to place responsibility for whatever mess ensues squarely on the shoulders of the fractious leadership in Baghdad. If the scenario is a far cry from the kind of nation-building advocated by Bush, it also comes more than six years, tens of thousands of civilian deaths, 4,200 military deaths and hundreds of billions of dollars later.
With an all-voluntary US military force stretched across two major conflicts in recent years, any troop increase in Afghanistan necessarily requires an accompanying drawdown in Iraq.
More troops alone is not the answer but their withdrawal will point to the fragility of the “new Iraq” they helped to build. The top American commander in Iraq, Gen. Ray Odierno, has already warned that a fifth of US combat troops would remain in Iraqi cities beyond the June 30 deadline for them to pull back. Those forces would be concentrated in Baghdad and the northern city of Mosul, considered Al-Qaeda’s last stronghold in the country, because they have largely moved out of other cities, he said. The numbers at hand are politically sensitive for both Obama and Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki, who have vowed to reduce the US military presence but are now faced with a rise in violence.
Obama’s plan calls for up to 50,000 troops remaining in Iraq through 2011 after all combat troops return home next August. Those “transitional forces” have prompted criticism even from Obama’s allies on the left, but it remains unclear whether they or the US civilian presence in the country can solve challenges that have become almost endemic to Iraq since the US-led invasion in 2003.
As Obama himself has acknowledged, Iraq has taught the US important lessons about the caution that should be exercised before going to war. In unveiling his drawdown plan in February, Obama said the US should only go to war “with clearly defined goals” after considering “the costs of action” and gathering support both at home and abroad.
The new US president must also take care not to give in to unrealistic expectations over how what Iraq will look like in two and a half years’ time. His stated goal to accompany the end of the war — “an Iraq that is sovereign, stable and self-reliant” — remains ambitious and perhaps impossible to fulfill in the near future.
Obama won the White House promising to win the battle in Afghanistan. Although he has more leeway there, being bogged down in Iraq could cost Obama the support of a war-weary public. A swift and glory-filled American success in Afghanistan, where US and international troops are battling a mounting insurgency, is an unlikely outcome, at best. Even a cursory look at Afghan history points to how poorly foreign forces — massive reinforcements notwithstanding — have fared there. And despite Obama’s promises to boost civilian efforts and engage neighbors in the region — chief among them Pakistan — Afghanistan could still become his Vietnam.
As Congress prepares to pass a supplemental war budget that is several billion dollars above the White House’s $83 billion request, and US troops once again heading for the battlefield, there is a new urgency in defining the limits of American engagement. Will the new administration be able to resist the temptation of rebuilding a war-torn nation and restrict itself to Obama’s narrowly-defined goal to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan”?
If it can’t keep to those narrow aims, it is in for a long, bloody haul.
