In the face of what it regards as a growing US threat, Russia is developing a new generation of nuclear missiles and launchers. Last week it test-fired its new SS-18 long-range missile for the first time. Moscow remains deeply suspicious of the proposed US missile shield that it sees as altering the balance of nuclear power. It is, therefore, determined to catch up. China is unlikely to be far behind.
Therefore the threat of a new nuclear arms race looms in the very month that the old START 1 arms limitation treaty runs out and at a time when Russian and US negotiators were supposed to be close to agreeing a new treaty that could be signed by presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama.
It matters not that Moscow and Washington have agreed to abide by the START 1 provisions until a new deal is cut. Something has gone seriously wrong.
One explanation may lie in the almost total disappearance of an expression that was once a commonplace when discussing atomic weaponry during the Cold War. That expression is “Nuclear Deterrence”. It encapsulated the awful reality that both atomic superpowers had sufficient devastating power in their respective arsenals. If one side launched a missile strike, the other would respond immediately. The assurance of mutual destruction was the guarantee that these horrific weapons would never be used, though the world did come close to nuclear Armageddon during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.
Indeed with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the deterrent effect of the nuclear option was lauded as having saving the world from fresh global conflict and was used as an argument for keeping America’s terrible arsenal. However, in the last decade, for Washington deterrence has morphed into the concept of physically interdicting a nuclear strike with the missile shield. Thus the United States and maybe its allies could be saved from destruction but still had the option of striking back and laying waste the attacker. That sounds fine from a self-regarding American point of view. However, from the Russian or Chinese standpoint, the analysis is quite different. Washington could launch a first strike and then use its missile shield to protect it from the inevitable retaliation. Therefore far from being a defensive move, the shield can be regarded as an offensive gambit and thus itself the opening step in a new nuclear arms race. The fresh element is the arrival of new nuclear powers, North Korea for sure and Iran very possibly. Coupled with the fears for the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, with India’s concern over fresh confrontations with China if not indeed also with Pakistan, with Israel’s undeclared nuclear hoard and with the possibility that other emerging economic powers, such as Brazil may pursue the nuclear option, the concept of nuclear deterrence is no longer so simple. Perhaps Washington and Moscow each in their own way fear any new disarmament deal because of these variables. The answer, therefore, is surely to try to broaden the disarmament negotiations to include all nuclear powers, including Israel.
