Jordan’s position within the regional conflict has shifted

For most of this year’s Iran war, Jordan’s role has been that of an interceptor rather than a target. As it did in April 2024, when it shot down Iranian drones and missiles crossing its airspace toward Israel, the kingdom spent the early months of the conflict defending its skies alongside American forces.
However, this changed last week, when an Iranian ballistic missile and drone attack on a base in Jordan killed two US service members, with a third reported missing and now also believed to be dead. Two days later, Amman summoned Iran’s charge d’affaires to protest what it described as continued and unjustified attacks on Jordanian territory.
Washington, which launched a new wave of retaliation against Iranian forces as a result of the attack, is treating the deaths as a direct attack on American personnel. The war has now crossed from the Gulf and Lebanon and into the wider Levant, as Jordan finds itself absorbing military, energy and economic shocks all at once.
Last week’s attack represents more than an isolated security incident — it marks a fundamental shift in Jordan’s position within the regional conflict. For years, Amman sought to limit its role to containing the spillover of regional crises while avoiding becoming a direct party to them. That strategy is now becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.
At the same time, Amman faces a delicate political balancing act. Its security partnership with the US and its own national interests require a firm response to attacks on its territory. Yet the government must also manage a domestic environment in which broader anti-Western sentiment continues to shape public opinion.
Meanwhile, as the Strait of Hormuz becomes increasingly vulnerable to disruption, alternative trade and energy corridors have gained renewed importance, placing Jordan at the center of regional diversification efforts.

US aid and Gulf investment will remain essential shock absorbers that Jordan’s own fiscal position cannot provide.

Zaid M. Belbagi

This is most evident in the proposed $18 billion Basra-Aqaba pipeline, designed to transport up to 2.25 million barrels of Iraqi crude per day to the Red Sea, while bypassing Hormuz entirely. At the same time, Aqaba’s importance as a regional logistics and maritime hub has grown, with the port becoming an increasingly attractive alternative as security risks in the Gulf persist. The UAE’s AD Ports Group’s 30-year concession to develop and operate Aqaba further reflects the strategic importance attached to the corridor.
For Jordan, geography is becoming a strategic asset. This means that preserving the kingdom’s stability is no longer solely a Jordanian priority but a regional one. The more vulnerable the Gulf’s traditional energy routes become, the greater the incentive for Washington and Gulf partners to support Jordan’s economic resilience and security, ensuring that alternative trade and energy corridors remain viable.
Ultimately, Jordan’s resilience will depend on three variables: the duration of the conflict, the scale of external support, and domestic stability. A short conflict is likely to be manageable, while a prolonged disruption in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab Al-Mandab would not. Likewise, US aid and Gulf investment will remain essential shock absorbers that Jordan’s own fiscal position cannot provide. Finally, the greatest domestic risk lies in economic hardship compounding public anger over the wider regional conflict.
Jordan is not facing a single shock but a myriad of factors, with security, energy, trade and fiscal pressures reinforcing one another. Whether Amman can absorb these pressures will depend on how long they persist and whether external support keeps pace with the growing demands on the Jordanian state.

• Zaid M. Belbagi is a political commentator and an adviser to private clients between London and the Gulf Cooperation Council. X: @Moulay_Zaid