With a 911 km border with Syria, Turkiye has a direct strategic interest in the country’s stability and Ankara views a unified Syrian state as essential to securing their shared frontier and reducing refugee movements.
However, Turkiye’s interest in Syria’s reconstruction runs deeper than border management. It sees the rebuilding effort as a chance to consolidate its influence over Syria’s new leadership, strengthen a new regional alignment centered on Damascus and block Iran from reestablishing a foothold in Syria and Lebanon. These goals align with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambition to expand Turkiye’s regional reach, turning Syria’s reconstruction into a central pillar of Ankara’s long-term foreign and security policy.
Ankara currently maintains more than 20,000 military and security personnel across northwestern Syria, backed by integrated logistics, air cover, advanced equipment and missile defense systems — an operational footprint no other regional power can match. That role was formalized through a military cooperation agreement, signed in August 2025, which established joint programs covering counterterrorism, mine clearance, cyber defense, military engineering and logistics.
Turkish advisers are now helping modernize the Syrian army’s command structures and doctrine as part of a larger security sector reform drive. Turkish military delegations meet regularly with Syria’s Ministry of Defense to build out training infrastructure for the new armed forces and Ankara has posted a military attache in Damascus to oversee implementation.
Turkiye has coordinated with Gulf states, the EU and Washington to support Syria’s diplomatic rehabilitation
Zaid M. Belbagi
The scale of the task is considerable. Syria’s Ministry of Defense aims to expand the army from about 100,000 personnel to 200,000 within five years, folding in some 130 armed factions to create a unified force. That rebuilding starts from a low base. After the collapse of the Assad regime, Israeli strikes destroyed more than 85 percent of Syria’s military assets, including most of its air force, navy and key defense infrastructure. Turkiye has stepped into the resulting vacuum, supplying training, logistics and surveillance and communications systems, along with cost-effective hardware such as armored vehicles, Bayraktar drones, light weapons and short-range rocket systems.
Ankara and Damascus have committed to a comprehensive strategic partnership, which includes trade, energy, transport, infrastructure and investment, with reconstruction sitting at its core. Added to this is the economic integration that is already under way.
At June’s Citi Economies Summit in Gaziantep, the two governments announced plans to reopen the Islahiye Customs Gate and prepare the Nusaybin-Qamishli crossing, restoring commercial flows after years of closure. Turkish banks are also preparing to open branches in Syria and the two countries’ central banks are in talks to deepen their ties.
The ambition on trade is substantial, with a target of lifting annual bilateral trade from $3.7 billion to $5 billion within two years and to $10 billion by the early 2030s. Turkiye has also pushed for the lifting of US and EU sanctions on Syria, recognizing that sanctions relief is a precondition for the investment reconstruction will require.
Ankara is simultaneously working to embed Syria into wider regional connectivity. The proposed Four Seas Project envisions Syria and Turkiye as a strategic corridor linking the Gulf, the Caspian, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, while trilateral talks with Jordan aim to expand rail links, improve port connectivity and ease road freight across the Levant.
These initiatives position Turkiye as Syria’s principal bridge to regional and international markets. Energy cooperation illustrates this pattern. In August 2025, Azerbaijan’s state energy firm SOCAR agreed to export 1.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually to Syria via Turkiye, enabling the rehabilitation of existing power plants. Syrian Energy Minister Mohammed Al-Bashir confirmed that the deal should add up to four hours of electricity a day in some areas, highlighting Turkiye’s role not just as a trading partner but as a facilitator of Syria’s energy recovery.
Ankara’s approach has been reinforced through concrete agreements in trade, energy infrastructure and education
Zaid M. Belbagi
Turkiye has also worked to rebuild Syria’s international legitimacy, coordinating diplomatic engagement with regional and Western partners. Following the fall of the Assad regime, Ankara worked closely with Saudi Arabia to encourage recognition of the new Syrian authorities. In fact, President Ahmad Al-Sharaa chose Turkiye and Saudi Arabia for his first official foreign visits, a signal of both countries’ centrality to Syria’s transition.
Ankara pressed directly for the removal of Western sanctions. US President Donald Trump said his decision to lift American sanctions followed consultations with Erdogan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, while Erdogan also took part in the first high-level contact between Trump and Al-Sharaa. Turkiye has continued coordinating with Gulf states, the EU and Washington to support Syria’s diplomatic rehabilitation.
Institutional cooperation has also begun to translate into concrete action. In July 2025, the Turkish and Syrian ministries of education signed an education cooperation protocol encompassing curriculum development, vocational and technical education, teacher training, special education, assessment systems, and the rehabilitation of schools damaged during the conflict.
Earlier, in May 2025, the two countries signed their first higher education cooperation protocol since Bashar Assad’s fall, committing to establish a joint Turkiye-Syria university, modernize Syrian universities, develop joint degree programs, mutually recognize academic qualifications and facilitate the return of tens of thousands of Syrian graduates educated in Turkiye.
Taken together, developments across the security, economic, diplomatic and institutional spheres point to a reconstruction process in which Turkiye has emerged as Syria’s principal organizing force. Ankara’s influence is structured by its geographic proximity, an established military presence and its early decision to back Syria’s new government — an approach that has since been reinforced through concrete agreements in trade, energy infrastructure and education.
Whether this influence proves durable, however, will depend on factors beyond Ankara’s control. The trajectory of sanctions relief, the ability of Syria’s newly constituted armed forces to consolidate authority, and the willingness of regional and international actors to accommodate Turkiye’s expanding role will all shape the extent to which Ankara can translate its current advantages into long-term strategic influence.
- Zaid M. Belbagi is a political commentator and an adviser to private clients between London and the Gulf Cooperation Council.
X: @Moulay_Zaid
