Last October when the Bush administration started flying kites about regime change in Iraq it provoked cries of indignation from many, including the European Union.
The argument was that it was outrageous that a superpower should try to change the regime in another country.
By January there was a feeling that Washington would not abandon its campaign to change the Iraqi regime, and the European indignation was replaced with counsels of prudence.
Now the argument was that regime change, although a legitimate goal, might prove costly.
Last month a new phase began with the visit to Texas by British Prime Minister Tony Blair.
The new consensus is that regime change is inevitable and might, after all, not be as costly as earlier assumed. Last week the Bush administration flew a much bigger kite by leaking news of an alleged "plan" prepared by the Pentagon to translate the president’s threat into action.
The argument now is about the type of regime to be promoted as an alternative to President Saddam Hussein’s.
Many in the European Union, in the Arab world and even in the United States, are concerned that the replacement of the " devil we know" by one unknown might create more problems that it would solve.
"How do we know what follows Saddam Hussein will not be worse?" asks French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine.
The question is legitimate and must be answered as part of shaping policy. A similar question was asked last winter when the US-led coalition went for regime change in Kabul.
Some political figures and pundits, not all anti-Americans, expressed concern that the overthrow of the Taleban might plunge Afghanistan into a new civil war. They pointed to the mixed record of anti-Taleban groups, including the Northern Alliance, to justify their concern.
It was to address that concern that the Bonn conference of Afghan opposition groups was organized under the auspices of the United Nations. The Bonn Accords worked like magic, convincing even cynical observers that Afghanistan might, after all, get a better deal after the Taleban.
Now that the US, and almost certainly Britain too, are decided to work for regime change in Baghdad they should consider a Bonn-style exercise for Iraq.
As things stand, there is no coherent Iraqi opposition with a clear policy. This is understandable.
Almost all Iraqi opposition groups are headquartered in exile and depend, at least to some extent, on the goodwill of host countries. It is not easy for them to behave in ways that would simultaneously please Washington and London as well as Damascus and Tehran, among other capitals.
Left to their devices the Iraqi opposition parties are unlikely to abandon the safety of " taqiyyah" (dissimulation) and come out with the clear choices without which no political change is possible.
These groups need to be brought together, perhaps in Bonn, and persuaded to take collective decisions that they cannot take individually.
Those decisions would provide the structure of a program for a new regime. On the basis of that program an interim leadership could be formed. The international community could then support a program and an Iraqi leadership.
Who could sponsor a Bonn conference for Iraq?
The obvious choice, as in the case of Afghanistan, is the United Nations. The UN might conclude that it could no longer persuade President Saddam to honor his obligations. The Iraqi regime-in-waiting could, therefore, emerge as a credible partner for the UN.
If the UN is unable to sponsor the conference, the European Parliament that, unlike the European governments, has little sympathy for Saddam Hussein, may play host.
What should such a conference decide?
First, it is important to assert Iraq’s national unity, integrity and independence. That would put an end to schemes to carve Iraq across ethnic and/or religious lines, and remove suspicions that some Kurds may be working for division by promoting " federal" and/or "confederal" ideas.
Second, the national, rather than the religious, nature of the Iraqi state should be emphasized. Ever since it came into being in 1921, Iraq, regardless of the regime changes, has had a secular system of government. A reaffirmation of that fact would put an end to hopes and fears of imposing an Iranian-style " Islamic" republic in Baghdad.
Third, consensus must be achieved on a policy of peaceful coexistence with all neighbors. That means an end to the " taqiyyah" that some Iraqi opposition groups practice with regard to Kuwait and, to a lesser extent, border disputes with Iran and Turkey. It also means a commitment to discontinue programs for weapons of mass destruction for at least 10 years.
Fourth, there should be consensus about the democratic nature of the future regime and full respect for human rights. The tradition of changing governments through plots and coups d’etat should be abandoned for good. A system of proportional representation should be introduced so that no single ethnic and/or religious group could win an absolute majority in any future parliament.
Fifth, there should be consensus about equality for women in all walks of life.
These are issues that none of the groups can tackle individually.
If one opposition mullah speaks of democracy, another would jeer at him for having "betrayed Islam". If one Kurdish chief endorses a centralized form of government, another would accuse him of abandoning " the Kurdish cause".
Iraqi opposition leaders, like most other opposition leaders in exile, spend a good part of their time fighting one another rather than their common enemy.
Any plan for regime change in Iraq should be shaped as a means of supporting the Iraqi people in their quest to bring their nation out of the impasse created by the present leadership.
Many ask: who will be the Iraqi Karzai?
That is the least important issue.
Just weeks before he was pushed center-stage, Karzai was running a small restaurant near Washington. What gave him a chance was the Bonn conference and the consensus it produced.
Can the Iraqis do the same?
The answer right now is: No.
But the main law of politics is change. Things change; sometimes quite fast.
