President George W. Bush’s “vision” for the Middle East, which he has decided not to reveal for the moment, does not seem to be what the world should wait for with bated breath. One key part of the “vision”, promised to herald a new direction for America’s Middle East policy, includes a proposal that will make any hope of a settlement fleeting — the introduction of the qualifying term “provisional” or “interim” attached to any mention of a Palestinian state. The expression was obviously meant as a compromise between the need to recognize the establishment of a Palestinian state in the near future and Ariel Sharon’s position that it is premature to talk of a final-status agreement, which is essentially what a state boils down to, and his alternative proposal for a long-term interim agreement.
Enter thus an interim Palestinian state. But what does it mean? The notion of an interim state is unheard of in international politics. There are interim governments and interim presidents, never an interim state. And look at other “interims” that the Palestinians have had a taste of. The 1993 Oslo Accord was interim. It was to have led to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state within five years. Four years later, the only thing the United States could come up with was a state which might exist one day only to disappear the next. This interim entity will exercise virtually no power or influence and as such, could be abolished, subject as it will be to the vagaries of Israeli policy.
A provisional state will have none of the prerogatives of statehood, no final borders, no capital, and no say in when or indeed if Israel will pull out of Palestinian territories. The term “provisional” turns the very notion of statehood on its head. The word “state” is deprived of all content when linked with the word provisional. With only two-fifths of the West Bank and two-thirds of Gaza in their hands, there is absolutely no guarantee that the Palestinian state will extend in the future to include all territories captured in 1967. Palestinians will get stuck with an interim arrangement that would leave them with, at best, 40 percent of the territories Israel occupied in 1967.
The idea provides too little hope for the Palestinians while heightening risks. Once declared, this state-to-be (rather, not-to-be) may gain substantial momentum by virtue of the fact that it would be the only alternative on the table to the impasse. Another problem: This compromise solution is a tacit admission that the Palestinian problem is not amenable at this point in time and that the best that can be hoped for is a hiatus in the confrontation. Talks on any final agreement must be based on guiding principles — Israel’s withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967, including east Jerusalem, the dismantling of illegal settlements in the West Bank, together with a recognition of the right of return of Palestinian refugees forced by Israel to leave their homeland.
This appellation by Bush defies explanation because the provisional tag goes against the very concept of statehood. The only thing that must be provisional is the Israeli occupation, not a Palestinian state. Provisional plans do not solve problems. They simply defer them.
