“Expect the unexpected.” And the new Gulf War began as expected — unexpectedly.
The US had prepared the world for an attack on Iraq that would generate “shock and awe” among victims and observers, or, as Donald Rumsfeld said, “of force, scope and scale which go beyond anything which has gone before”.
But the first strikes, at about 02.30 GMT Thursday, were relatively few in number and directed exclusively at the Iraqi leadership — “opportunity targets”, we were told. After a four-hour meeting, the US leadership decided the opportunity to decapitate the regime was too good to miss and launched 36 cruise missiles, reinforced by F-117a Nighthawk stealth fighters, at two targets in and south of Baghdad.
The massive pre-planned assault may not have been scheduled for a further 48 hours. The opening shots may have brought that forward, too. The assault proper began as soon as darkness fell on Thursday night.
This time, the massive bombardment, with artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems and larger tactical missiles, accompanied the movement of US and British armored formations into Iraq.
Soon after the morning attacks, Iraq launched retaliatory missiles against a now deserted base in Kuwait. That may have provoked the US into bringing forward its invasion. A military operation differs from a surgical one in one major respect: in war, the patient is not unconscious and strapped down. It convulses, lashes out, fights back and spits venom.
The US plan left space to exploit windows of opportunity and it seems that is what happened. Moving away from the massive, pre-planned and attritional air bombardments of 1991 and 1999 was not a radical new military strategy but a rediscovery of what smart commanders have always known. The military call it the “manoeuvrist approach”, an approach that was more evident in Afghanistan. Being “manoeuvrist” means adjusting to the ebb and flow of battle.
As the great Chinese philosopher warrior Sun Tzu, author of The Art of War, put it: “An army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes weakness...As water has no constant form, in war there are no constant conditions.” The first target yesterday was a meeting of five senior Iraqi leadership figures, perhaps including Saddam Hussein. At $1m a shot, 36 cruise missiles may seem a lot, but had they achieved their aim the money would have been very well spent.
Instead, the attack acted as a gauntlet slapped across the face of the Iraqi command. It responded with missile attacks — probably the short-range Al-Samouds that had been the target of UN disarmament efforts. Some reports said they were Scuds but that seems unlikely, given that the Scud’s main advantage is its range and the targets, possibly including Kuwait City, were relatively close to Iraqi forward units. The initial strike and response have much in common with earlier wars. Carefully orchestrated set-piece assaults are often preceded by “reconnaissance by battle” — smaller, probing attacks.
There were also reports of large numbers of Iraqis trying to surrender, even before the ground war started, and of Iraqi units following the instructions — in leaflets dropped from the air — to deploy their vehicles in a certain way to indicate they wanted to give in. In the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi troops were disarmed and sent to prisoner-of-war camps. This time, drawing on lessons from Afghanistan, some surrendering troops may be left intact, as units.
The news that a helicopter crashed in Iraq shortly before the first strike was further confirmation that special forces had been operating in Iraq. Many Afghan factions were bought over by the British and US, using dollars and mobile phones. Establishing communication with units that might want to defect is an important special forces mission.
Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of the new war received little attention, although it was reported in the opening hours. The US military seems to have taken over the main Iraqi state radio frequency as the first strikes happened. “This is the day we have been waiting for,” an announcer said in Arabic.
The 21st-century US military clearly has a sophisticated ability to manipulate the media. This is information warfare and “reflexive control” — influencing the enemy’s thoughts to make him do what you want.
— Christopher Bellamy is professor of military science and doctrine at Cranfield University, Bedfordshire. He reported on the 1991 Gulf War for The Independent