CAMP NEW JERSEY, Kuwait, 24 March 2003 — The desolate battlefield landscape is the same, and so too is the overmatched enemy. But on day three of the attack on Iraq, it seems increasingly clear that superficial similarities between the current conflict and the Gulf War of 1991 mask profound differences that illuminate how the world and the American military have changed in 12 years.
While the Gulf War had a distinct beginning, middle and end, capped with ticker-tape parades in Washington and New York, many officers here believe that Operation Iraqi Freedom is just the latest campaign in a protracted global war that likely will last for the rest of their careers and beyond.
“If you lay out what has happened since the invasion of Grenada in 1983, then Panama in ‘89, then the Gulf War in ‘90-91, you can take that right on through 9-11 and Afghanistan to where we are today,’’ said Lt. Col. Kevin Felix, a staff officer with the 101st Airborne Division. “I suspect there’s something else out there on the horizon. You hope that peace breaks out, but hope is not always a method.’’
“Method” is in fact a singular feature of this war, from the prodigal use of precision, “standoff” weapons to the agile projection of power half a world away. The Gulf War foreshadowed this conflict in the same way that the rudimentary mechanized and aviation combat of World War I presaged the wheeled, tracked and aerial combat of World War II.
Gen. Tommy Franks, commander of all US forces in this region, underscored the singularity of the current operation Saturday by declaring it “a campaign unlike any other in history.’’
The tactics and weaponry wielded against Iraq during the last several days reflect the investment of a nation in a more or less permanent state of war, and a nation determined to maintain a wide gap over any and all military rivals. That gap is more pronounced than at any time since 1945, when powerful enemies in Germany and Japan lay eviscerated, and powerful allies in the Soviet Union and Britain were exhausted and depleted.
The military that dispatched three corps and two thousand airplanes for Desert Storm had been designed for a defensive war, particularly a titanic battle in central Europe against Soviet invaders. The force proved serendipitously suited to fight in the open desert against an Iraqi army that fielded Soviet equipment and mirrored Soviet tactics.
The US forces now fighting in Iraq, a fraction the size of those here in 1991, have over the past decade been retooled for expeditionary war. Four days into this conflict it appears also to be serendipitously suited to fight the pre-emptive, largely unilateral campaign that characterizes President Bush’s national security doctrine in the wake of September 11, 2001.
Brig. Gen. Benjamin Freakley, the 101st assistant division commander for operations and a Gulf War veteran, said: “There was always the question of whether Desert Storm was the last of the army’s big mechanized wars or a window to the future. I think it was a window.’’
Major advances have been made in many combat systems, making the US military today more lethal than in 1991. The offensive into Iraq has been predicated on shock, intimidation, and speed, a 21st century American version of the blitzkrieg tactics used by Germany to overrun much of Europe in WWII.
Some systems that were new in the Gulf War are now mature, and fully integrated into the force, such as ATACMs, a rocket artillery system with a range approaching 200 miles, and JSARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System), an airborne scout able to see individual moving vehicles more than 100 miles away.
Other weapons were little more than a brainstorm in Desert Storm. For example, a new generation of “smart” munitions, like the relatively cheap and plentiful Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), use global positioning satellites to home in on targets. The “dumb” unguided bombs that accounted for more than 90 percent of the tonnage dropped against Iraq in 1991, have reportedly been supplanted by an equally disproportionate number of precise munitions. And unlike the older smart bombs, which were guided by laser beams or television cameras in their noses, the new GPS weapons are relatively immune to bad weather, smoke or fog.
Across the force, similar innovations have enhanced the military’s decades-long quest for “stand off” killing power — the ability to attack with precision while stay outside an opponent’s lethal range. The new Longbow model of the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, for example, can fire a radar-guided Hellfire missile — capable to striking a tank up to five miles away — much more sophisticated than its 1991 laser-guided version. From new engines on Chinook helicopters to the large hanger north of here, where Predator and Hunter drones are housed, the arsenal is generally more nimble and more potent.
It also fits together. The essence of modern warfare is “combined operations” combat — the meticulous integration of aviation, infantry, armor, intelligence, artillery and other assets. Among military powers, only the United States is exceptionally proficient in combined operations. The Iraqis are far behind. “If they have improved,” one general said, “they certainly haven’t improved like we have improved.’’
“You see a generation of soldiers who know how to prosecute a war because they’ve been doing it so much,’’ said Lt. Col. Jeffrey E. Vuono, an artillery officer who served in the 1st Armored Division during Desert Storm.
“It’s so different than the last time,’’ Vuono added. “It’s not Desert Storm Lite. Last time the task was to expel Iraq from Kuwait. This time it’s to empower the Iraqi people and eliminate a threat to the United States.’’
It’s also different in demonstrating flexibility and unpredictability. Rather than conducting a protracted air campaign — the bombing in 1991 lasted five weeks before the ground attack — the war this week began with a ground assault that preceded the heavy bombardment of Baghdad.
Yet the potency of the American force will be challenged by the audacity of the plan. Distances are vast, logistical challenges enormous, political conditions ambiguous. Franks Saturday warned that “there may well be tough days,’’ while also voicing the confidence that only comes with a force that has no peer. “The outcome is not in doubt,’’ he said.