WASHINGTON, 8 April 2003 — Even as the battle for Baghdad is under way, the Bush administration is engaged in intensive debate over how to handle the other two countries it includes in its “axis of evil’’: North Korea and Iran.
At issue is more than a simple ideological clash between hawks and doves, or a turf war between State Department and Pentagon officials. It is a struggle between risk-averse conservatives and hard-charging neoconservatives over what the United States can and should do about potentially hostile regimes that are developing weapons of mass destruction.
Both groups agree it is unacceptable for North Korea and Iran to become nuclear powers. The question is how to stop them, with conservatives emphasizing diplomacy and neoconservatives willing to contemplate force.
Strategic decisions cannot be made until the damage from the Iraq war is tallied and the administration can gauge the extent of the American diplomatic, military, financial and human resources that will be consumed by the post-war occupation and reconstruction of Iraq, two senior administration officials said last week.
Despite being a hawk, one administration source acknowledged that the United States has limited resources to pursue a global war on terrorism and weapons proliferation.
“Just because we’re the world’s only superpower, there are still only 24 hours in the day,’’ he said. “It’s just a practical fact of life that you can only do so much on multiple crises at the same time...If we hadn’t had Iraq, we could have done more on North Korea.’’
Through the haze and confusion of war, one thing is clear: The lessons of Iraq will be vigorously debated inside and outside the administration.
“Human nature being what it is, history suggests that you’ll have no more consensus afterward than you had before,’’ Richard Haass, the State Department’s director of policy planning, said last week. “Every war is fought three times. It’s fought before, on whether you should go to war. It’s fought on the ground. And it’s fought afterward, about the lessons. And I expect this war will be the same.’’
Which view wins out will shape the president’s decisions on North Korea and Iran. And the conclusions may not be as obvious as prewar punditry suggested.
Conversations with four senior US officials over the last two weeks, all conducted on condition of anonymity, show an administration eager to dispel the image of a global “cowboy’’ with a one-size-fits-all-rogues approach that is ready to attack North Korea and Iran as soon as it finishes with Iraq.
All four expressed optimism that US problems with North Korea and Iran can be resolved through diplomacy. But sharp differences emerged over approach.
On the eve of the US-led assault on Iraq, one senior official was pressed for details on how the United States intended to deal with Iran’s nuclear programs. Asked what message Washington would like to send Tehran, the official replied: “Take a number.’’
Upon hearing of that remark, another senior official bristled with anger. “You’d better check the credibility of your source,’’ he said. Indeed, he argued, the war on Iraq could put the US-Iranian relationship on a better footing. He noted that US contacts with the Iranians during the war had been frank and productive.
The two men work at the same agency.
North Korea is “still a situation we think can be managed,’’ one US official said. “And you will notice that although the primary focus over the last two weeks has been Iraq, we haven’t taken our eyes off North Korea, and things have been moderately calmer.’’
For several months, US officials have been openly critical of China for not pressuring its North Korean ally enough to curb its nuclear brinksmanship. Such comments were notably absent last week. There were unconfirmed reports that the Chinese, who supply most of North Korea’s energy, had temporarily shut down an oil pipeline to North Korea as a warning to Pyongyang not to go nuclear.
One official hinted that some form of talks might be in the offing, adding, “Compared to three or four weeks ago, we’re in a better place with regards to North Korea.’’
On Saturday, Japan’s Kyodo news agency reported that an American special envoy had met in New York with North Korea’s deputy permanent representative at the United Nations for three days early in the week.
The United States also is pursuing action on North Korea in the UN Security Council. The Council will take up North Korea’s noncompliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty tomorrow. In January, North Korea became the first of 188 nations to withdraw from the treaty, effective April 11.
US officials hope to win a unanimous statement of condemnation from the Council — still bitterly divided over Iraq — that will show North Korean leader Kim Jong Il that the international community, and not just the United States, abhors his nuclear ambitions.
In a pre-emptive strike, North Korea Saturday lashed out at the United Nations, warning it would not abide by any action of the Security Council. “The UN seems to have lost its mandate because of the US invasion of Iraq,’’ declared a statement on the KCNA news service.
Economic sanctions and interdiction of North Korean ships to stop nuclear or missile exports are possibilities, and force remains an option, one US official said.
Preventing a nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula is one of three items on the administration’s postwar “to-do list’’ that are not deemed optional. The other two are continuing the reconstruction of Afghanistan and consolidating the US position in Iraq, officials said.
The president has also said he intends to push the “road map’’ he has released to try to restart the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
But current and former US officials are openly divided over one agenda item: Iran.
In a speech last month, Bush asserted the right to preventive strikes against terrorist states that would harm the United States. “Responding to such enemies only after they have struck first is not self-defense,’’ the president said. “It is suicide.’’
The administration is deeply disturbed by Iran’s harboring of top-level Al-Qaeda members, its bankrolling of the Hezbollah group, and by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s recent inspection that confirmed what Washington has long asserted: that Iran is much closer than anyone had thought to developing a nuclear bomb.
Issues under discussion range from whether the threat of sanctions or military force would push Iran to rush even faster for the security of nuclear weapons; whether its nascent democracy will triumph over or be crushed by theocracy; and even whether attempts by the “Great Satan’’ to strengthen Iranian reformers are counterproductive and should be scrapped.