There are still many Turkish Cypriots who deeply regret the failure of their politicians this spring to reach a settlement that would have reunited the Greek and Turkish parts of their island.
The collapse of the negotiations between Rauf Denktash, the only leader the Turkish Cypriots have known since Cyprus was partitioned in 1974, and the equally venerable Greek politician Glafcos Clerides came about through Denktash’s intransigence. He stuck out for a better deal, even though the Greeks were already deeply unhappy with the terms of the UN-brokered settlement.
It was a grievous misjudgment. The international community wanted an honest solution to 30 years of partition and was prepared to pay a good price for it. But it was not going to be browbeaten. The chance may not now come again for a very long time. The UN and the EU have given up in despair. Greek Cyprus will join the EU next year. Turkish Cyprus will not. And more importantly, mainland Turkey’s own long campaign for EU membership has probably suffered a further setback.
Yet with classic misjudgment, Ankara has now brokered a very public trade deal with the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, a state which only Turkey now recognizes. The agreement, which removes all trade obstacles between Turkish Cyprus and the mainland is, says Ankara, supposed to help integrate Northern Cyprus into the European Union. This is to make the very worst of an already bad deal. The Turkish government seems to imagine that the Denktash government can benefit from the associate member trading status that Turkey already enjoys with Brussels.
The EU will not take kindly to such a blatant attempt to insinuate Turkish Cyprus into the EU by another route. And in the unlikely event that Brussels turned a blind eye, it is certain that the new Greek Cypriot government of Tassos Papadopoulos, who is no friend of Denktash, will protest along with the Greek government in Athens. It may well be that Ankara is either going to have to make a humiliating retreat from this trade deal or will stick stubbornly to the arrangement, thus impairing its relationships both with the EU as a whole and its neighbor Greece in particular.
It is conceivable that with this move the Turkish government hopes to reopen the reunion negotiations, with the largely spurious trade link the catalyst. But how could such a ploy work? The only consequence of this provocative agreement will be to further alienate the UN and the EU and the Greek Cypriots. Though Turkey’s diplomatic service has long represented the cream of its civil service, the politicians who direct it are frequently less subtle and skilled. In particular they overlook the basic lesson of crisis management, which is that when you find yourself in a hole, you stop digging.
