LONDON, 19 December 2003 — Whatever their view on the invasion of Iraq, most European leaders were well pleased with the capture of Saddam Hussein last weekend. If nothing else, it turned the media away from postmortems on the failed summit in Brussels.
Not that failure of the summit itself was so awful. Most of the participants were predicting disaster even before they met. The real embarrassment was that the heads of state meeting so obviously welcomed its failure. It got British Prime Minister Tony Blair off the hook of an agreement that could only cause him problems at home.
It enabled the Spanish prime minister to go home claiming he’d fought off all attempts to reduce his country’s voting rights. The Irish, the Danes, the Dutch have been saved — for the time being — the embarrassment of referendums that they might well lose. Even President Chirac seemed content enough that he’d been saved from a treaty which was neither popular at home nor conducive to his vision of a two-speed Europe led by himself and Germany.
As for the master of the ceremonies, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and his suggestion that that they discuss “football and women” to break the ice, the simple truth is that Italy is not madly keen on joining up to an independent foreign policy and a tighter community either.
Given this, it seems idle to talk of the European leaders getting back together to iron out their differences early next year, when the Irish take over the presidency. Nor does it make much sense to argue, as Jack Straw, the British foreign secretary, did after the collapse of the talks, that agreement had been reached on “85 percent” of the treaty (i.e. the bits we wanted) and that the remaining differences really needed only one more heave to overcome.
The tensions are far more deep rooted than that. The fundamental problem is that too few European countries see the advantage in pushing further down the road a new constitution to make it feasible. And, worse, they lack the democratic legitimacy to do so.
Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroder may talk bravely of forming an “avant garde” of nations who will deepen integration without the others, but the fact is that, even in France and Germany, the majority of the population has lost its belief in the benefits of the European Union now, let alone in the future. A multispeed Europe is possible, a two-speed one led by France and Germany is just a throwback to an impossible past.
Expansion eastwards, which should have been the occasion of real hope for a Europe re-energized and refocused by the fall of the Berlin Wall, instead has become the subject of endless bickering over money and loyalties. Monetary union, which might have been expected to bind countries closer together, has been undermined by failing growth rates and the wholly insensitive determination of France and Germany to breach the rules three years in a row.
While Gerhard Schroder angrily accused Spain and Poland of putting national interest before community spirit, what else was France and Germany’s breach of the Growth and Stability pact, or their pursuit of a voting system that would favor them.
This should be the cause of sobriety not despair for anyone who believes in Europe. Enlargement has made impossible not just the old mechanisms of decision-making but also the old approach to European politics. The traditional means of pushing the union of 15 forward through a series of summits in which alliances of interests were formed and positions negotiated like a wage agreement won’t work in a union of 25. Summits like last weekend’s have had their day. If Europe is to proceed, it should be fluidly and continuously.
Nor is the effort to give the union greater legitimacy and momentum, through an increase in the power of the Council of Ministers and the appointment of a three-year president of Europe, a promising way forward. It merely entrenches the predominance of the major countries.
