WASHINGTON, 1 March 2004 — As the intifada approaches its bloody 3 1/2 year-milestone at a cost of almost 3,000 Palestinian and 1,000 Israeli dead, the question inevitably arises as to what role the United States will assume in addressing this conflict, given the natural tendency of past administrations to avoid the potential negative electoral consequences of dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in this, an election year.

President Bush’s Jan. 20, 2003 State of the Union address managed to disappoint even the much-lowered expectations of those concerned with Mideast peace. The speech entirely ignored the issue, not even using the words “Israel” or “Palestine” in the address.

This perception was reinforced by the president’s Library of Congress speech on democracy in the Middle East, on Feb. 4. Once again, not a single mention of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

All indications strongly point therefore to the Bush administration placing the road map into deep freeze, at least until after the November 2004 elections.

The president’s public speeches indicating US disengagement from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict point to the US believing that seeking peace in the Middle East is a lost cause and a waste of time and political capital.

The thinking is that the United States has achieved its strategic goal in preventing the spread of the Israel-Palestinian conflict to neighboring countries. In that vein, Washington’s concern about preventing escalation means that it will keep a close watch on Israeli Prime Minister Sharon, for fear that he will ignite the region through some excessive military action.

The US will pressure Israeli quietly and privately, taking advantage of the close relationship it has with Sharon and with the knowledge that he will not do anything to seriously endanger that. This has yielded limited results such as a shift of the original route of the separation barrier in some areas closer to the Green Line and pressure on the “settlement outposts”, and the humanitarian situation in the territories.

The Arab world, divided and busy with the survival of its regimes rather than with concern for the Palestinians, will continue to pay only lip service to the issue.

The White House meanwhile, rejects claims of negligence, repeating the mantra that “the president is involved,” and promising that the coming new order in the region will reinvigorate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and bring democracy and freedom to the Arab world.

The problem with this approach is that the facts on the ground aren’t waiting for either the coming new order or for Arab democracy. Meanwhile, vital US interests in the region continue to be damaged.

Despite Sharon using the word “occupation” for the first time recently and despite his acceptance of the inevitability of a Palestinian state, most analysts believe that Sharon is determined to prevent the establishment of a politically and economically viable Palestinian state based on the June 4, 1967 lines. He is willing for the time being to accept a Palestinian state comprising roughly 45 percent of the West Bank because he knows that such a state will be weak and neither economically nor politically viable. Israel will surround the area, controlling all points of access and be able to intervene militarily at will.

To realize this plan, Sharon has a multitude of weapons at his disposal: The separation barrier which has already resulted in the annexation of 16 percent of West Bank land, the building of settlements and construction of Israeli-only bypass roads intersecting Palestinian land, and the destruction of Palestinian civil, political, and educational institutions. The resulting despair will create the conditions that will force the Palestinians to leave “voluntarily.” These Israeli actions are ongoing and even accelerating as the 2004 US election approaches since the post-election landscape is unknown and may not be as friendly.

Even Sharon’s most recent statements regarding a Gaza pullout are not inconsistent with this plan and have consequently been greeted with a great deal of skepticism. A Financial Times editorial on Feb. 4 stated that “appearing to give up so much will make it easier to take elsewhere — from the West Bank.” The division of the West Bank envisaged under the security barrier is consistent with the map Sharon drew up for the West Bank in 1982, known as Military Order Number 50.

This was echoed in the Israeli English-language daily Haaretz. In an opinion piece titled “Gaza in Exchange for the West Bank,” Aluf Benn writes: “Sharon is prepared to pay with the evacuation of Gaza for American consent to Israel’s continued control over a large part of the West Bank.”

All this means tha moving toward a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict requires a robust and active process of re-engagement by the US. For this re-engagement to succeed and also be perceived by the Arab and Muslim worlds as sincere, it must consist of the following components:

• A clear and unequivocal articulation by the United States of an “end-game” for the process, not limited simply to a Palestinian state, which even Sharon has accepted. What such a statement needs to include is the words “based on the 1967 borders” for it to have legitimacy among the Palestinians and provide them with a firm political horizon. Just as importantly, it will invigorate the large majorities of Israelis and Palestinians who support a two-state solution.

• Engage, recruit and encourage a “constituency of peace” of Jewish Americans, Israelis, Arab Americans and Arab states who support this vision. Polls have consistently shown a majority of both Palestinians and Israelis in support of a two-state solution. A Baker Institute poll in November 2003 found that a majority of Israeli and Palestinians (53.3 percent of Israelis and

55.6 percent of Palestinians) supported a two-state solution based on the 1967 lines with minor mutually agreed upon adjustments. A Zogby International poll of 500 Jewish and Arab Americans taken in mid-January 2004 found that Arab and Jewish Americans back US engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, but are also disappointed with President Bush’s performance in the region. Seventy-six percent of Jewish respondents rated Bush’s performance as negative, compared with 75 percent of Arab respondents. 73 percent of Arab Americans and 72 percent of Americans Jews said they would be more likely to support a political candidate who says the United States must be actively engaged in trying to bring peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

• Appoint a high-level US presidential envoy to the Middle East to work full-time on Israeli-Palestinian peace. Such an envoy would need to be, and perceived to be, empowered by the president. He or she would oversee each side taking reciprocal steps with close monitoring. On the Israeli side this would include a complete cessation of all settlement activity, an end to targeted assassinations, a removal of checkpoints, a freeze on sections of the separation barrier encroaching on Palestinian land, and the creation of conditions for the Palestinians to fulfill their security and political obligations. On the Palestinian side this would include the holding of Palestinian elections; a clear announcement of the end of the intifada and a prompt and effective end to all acts of violence; and a consolidation of the security services.

Contrary to popular myth, such an effort on the past of the United States, although not guaranteed to succeed, will be appreciated in both the US and the Arab and Muslim worlds, and will not come at a political cost for the president. It would be highly advisable for the announcement of such an effort to come in the form of a presidential address to the nation. During this address the president would articulate why it is in the critical national interests of the United States that an independent and viable Palestinian state be established.

A Palestinian state is critical in the war against terrorism, critical for Israel’s long-term security and critical for the flowering of democracy in the Middle East.

— Raafat Dajani is Executive Director of American Task Force on Palestine based in Washington, D.C.