ISLAMABAD, 24 July 2004 — On July 19 the federal Minister for Education Zubaida Jalal announced in the National Assembly that the government could include in the curriculum, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s historic speech of Aug. 11, 1947 made before the members of the Constitution Assembly. If carried through, this would be a significant departure from the Pakistani state’s earlier policy.

The state had ignored the speech and challenged its veracity. The key part of the speech read, “You are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed and that has nothing to do with the business of the state. You will find that in course of time Hindus will cease to be Hindus, Muslim will cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizen of the state.”

MMA’s parliamentary leader Qazi Hussain Ahmed did not oppose the minister’s proposition to include the speech. The August speech is singularly important for it enunciates the character of and a vision for a just Muslim state, a state that would treat all its citizens equally.

These are changing times for Pakistan, not just of policies and institutions but also of something more fundamental; the state’s own ideological moorings.

The business of ideology in Pakistan has never been an easy one, as would have been the case for any state created in the name of religion and one that subsequently faced unending problems in state building, policy formulation and political evolution.

The earliest warning on problems flowing from the state’s ad hoc approach to ideology was documented in the fifties in the Munir Commission report. These prevented an informed debate on state ideology from taking place.

The seventies power-play between political parties and the state institutions again defined the debate and ideology-related decisions.

The democratically elected Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, when confronted by the religious party-dominated opposition nexus with the army, sought refuge in quick fix ideological steps. Qadianis were declared a religious minority, religious statements introduced into passports, drinking banned and the promise to enforce Shariah made.

The problem was more with the way the politically hounded Bhutto clutched at these “ideological” measures for his survival, not the merits or demerits of these measures. Bhutto was threatened with removal and enforcement of Shariah.

Quaid-e-Azam’s legitimate vision communicated in his Aug. 11 speech was again trashed.

In the eighties under Gen. Zia ul-Haq’s dictatorship symbols of Islam were “used” for promoting, what the dictator concluded was in Pakistan’s national interest.

Religious fervor was incorporated as a potent tool in the jointly authored US-Pakistan anti-Soviet “jihad” operation. Pakistan also became the battleground for proxy war between different Muslim states.

Clearly in opting for this “jihad” partnership, the responsibility of the Pakistani state to protect the life, liberty and property of its own citizens, became secondary. The operational dimension of the state’s ideology in the eighties was largely reactive and domestically destructive.

Significantly the corollary to this ideology on the domestic front was Zia ul-Haq’s version of Islamization of state-controlled institutions including the schools, judiciary, electronic media and even certain dimensions of the armed forces.

The school curricula reflected intolerance and sectarianism while undermining the syllabus. Highly controversial laws like the hudood ordinance, law of evidence and subsequently the blasphemy law were enacted. These mutilated the essence of justice and fair play promoted by Islam. In government offices women were instructed to cover their head and offering of prayers became obligatory.

Within sections of the armed forces too a particular interpretation of religion was institutionalized.

This was, as was recently evident, was a dangerous addition to the perfectly plausible supranational Muslim consciousness that existed in the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

In the nineties, despite civilian rule, this brand of Islamization was not substantively reviewed. The militarized “jihad” infrastructure was still intact. This, among other factors, prevented the weak political governments, from reviewing disputed laws passed in the name of Islam.

Nawaz Sharif himself passed a Constitutional amendment seeking greater powers for the prime minister to enforce Shariah. When criticized, he turned to the men from religious seminaries and had urged them to be his “army” for helping him implement Shariah.

Benazir Bhutto much less prone to dabbling with controversial ideological moves, had entered into a political alliance with one of the sectarian parties in Punjab.

In 1999 with the return of military rule the ideological ethos of the state remained unchanged.

Gen. Pervez Musharraf rapidly retraced his steps after announcing revision in the implementation procedure of blasphemy law in 2000.

In mid-2001 at a Seerat-un-Nabi conference Musharraf raised concerns regarding impact on society of political extremism and misdirected religious zeal.

He proactively promoted appointment of women in important positions.

It was not until post 9/11 that the state of Pakistan controlled by military began a review of three state-controlled dimensions; of weaponized resistance infrastructure, laws and curriculum. Ironically the eighties Pakistan-US “jihad” partnership had proved the trigger for the “ideologization” of these three dimensions.

That in 2001 Washington sought this review is undeniable. Yet the more relevant and compelling truth is that it has long been Pakistan’s own need, articulated by civil society groups.

Many argued that the state apparatus not be made subservient to either a linear and static approach to Islam nor be hostage to any individual interpretation of religion or national interest.

At present the debate around the Wana operation, the reform in curriculum, changes in legislation and introduction of laws against inhuman practices like Karo Kari, is a positive development.

If backed by public and political support, these moves will have staying power.

The merits and demerits of these moves, established against the touchstone of Islamic values and humanism, and publicized through an open and informed public will drain vested interest and ignorance from the crucial question of state and ideology in Pakistan.

Fortunately the Pakistani state has begun to reorient itself; even if it is a long and bumpy journey ahead.

(Nasim Zehra is an Islamabad-based security analyst and fellow of the Harvard University Asia Center.)