If the Arab media want to play their rightful role in the region, they will have to put their house in order first, says Muhammad Fahd Al-Harithy, continuing his analysis of the coverage of the Iraq war by the world media. The Arab media need to become more professional too instead of merely dancing to the tune the public wants to hear. The facts may not be what the public wants to hear. This is the third in the series. The first and second parts appeared on Saturday and Sunday.
A demarcation labeled good or bad which is based on differences in perception is not logical. The reason is that love and hate, freedom and oppression are relative ideas. Western coverage of the war in Iraq should be viewed in light of this principle. Perfect neutrality and absolute honesty can scarcely be found on earth. Absolute freedom is only a dream that may exist only in Plato’s ideal republic. The difference in the treatment of civilians’ dead bodies and the general destruction resulting from the war in Iraq were reported in different lights by the Western and the Arab media. The difference was one of perception. The Western media showed the bodies and the destruction in a factual, purely informational way while the Arab media took a more sensational course, using both to whip up public opinion and emotion.
The different media organs of a country may treat a single issue in different ways and view it from different standpoints. The attitude of British newspapers to the Iraqi war was certainly not uniform. In general, the British newspapers showed their positions in editorials and in their attempts to be impartial when reporting the news. The Daily Telegraph supported the war while the Guardian maintained a reserved stand, focusing mainly on the war’s humanitarian issues. The Independent was strongly opposed to the idea of war from the very beginning and it regularly featured photos of mammoth protest rallies. The paper and its columnist Robert Fisk came in for severe criticism from the British government. Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon said the newspaper relied on unreliable sources and echoed the claims of the Iraqi regime. The Daily Mirror also took an anti-war stance. The Daily Mail, reserved in the war’s early stages, later swung to the side of those who supported the war. The Times was a strong supporter of the war as was the popular tabloid, The Sun. Both the Sun and The Times are, incidentally, owned by an Australian-born Jew, Rupert Murdoch who controls 35 percent of the British newspaper market. He also owns the New York Post and Fox News and was a staunch supporter of the war. In an Australian talk show last February, Murdoch admired President George Bush for his noble moral stand and correctness when he decided to go to war. “The war will help the world economy a great deal by bringing down the price of oil to $20 a barrel, a greater help than any tax cut by any country,” he said. Though Murdoch denied interference in the editorial policies of the publications he owns, British journalists recall how he forced the Sun to abandon its Conservative stand and support the Labour Party and Tony Blair. Murdoch’s situation, however, renewed the controversy over newspaper owners’ tendencies to influence the editorial stands of their papers.
Philip Taylor, a media specialist, regards the media as one of the most powerful propaganda tools. He views propaganda as an integral part of business administration and calls it “perception management.” He supports his viewpoint by citing the example of a former advertising executive who became US undersecretary of state for diplomacy and public affairs in October 2001. Any idea, including war, or any policy can be “sold” like a product. “After Sept. 11 there may not have been much need to market war in the United States, but the concept appears not to be working quite so well with more critical target audiences: Iraqis, the Muslim world generally and, most disconcertingly, the United States’ NATO allies,” the writer said.
By using methods such as supplying news at news conferences and leaking some items to the press, the government attempts to control the media. Commenting on these practices, a correspondent with New York Magazine narrated his experience in Doha. Forty-eight hours after his arrival at the American Central Command Headquarters in Doha, he realized that there was more information available in the headquarters than anywhere else in the world. Nonetheless, he was shocked to realize that four days after his arrival, he had less information about what was going on than he had had when he arrived. After a few more days he realized that he did not know anything at all. This is a very sobering fact. The problem was not the paucity of information but the sheer volume of information itself. There were, reportedly, more than 600 correspondents accompanying the American and British forces in Iraq. The journalists lived and traveled with the military units under the units’ protection. It is natural that correspondents sent reports only with the consent of the officers and in fulfillment of conditions set by the military authorities. How the military forces affected the journalists’ neutrality is something that remains to be carefully studied. There were instances of some embedded journalists who actually confused viewers. While one reporter said that the army had entered Basra, another reported that the army was approaching the city. Both correspondents might have been correct in their statements because they were attached to different units that were in different places. The contradiction apparently arose because the first correspondent was aware only of what was happening around him and did not know what was happening in any other unit. Whose perception was correct? Was either one?
This was not the first time that journalists were on the battlefield with military units. Something similar happened during World War II. In those days, however, limited communications facilities and huge cameras made mobility difficult and the time lag between the event and the broadcast made their reports ineffective. During the Vietnam War — known as “the television war” — cameramen played a vital part in shaping public opinion at home though the time lag between an event and its broadcast was a negative factor. In both Gulf War II and the Afghan War, advanced technology played a significant role in bringing pictures to viewers instantly despite official attempts to control the media. By the time of Gulf War III, IT development had almost totally eliminated any time lag between the event and its public broadcast. In addition, the number of sources and agencies covering the war made attempts to control coverage virtually ineffective. At the same time, there were journalists who refused to accompany military units because of their desire to move, see and report freely. Some of them paid dearly for their independence. More than 12 journalists were killed and a number of others were injured, making Gulf War III one of the most dangerous in terms of the loss of journalists’ lives.
It was alleged that some Arab stations and Arab journalists were singled out for attack. Making allegations without proof can only defeat the Arab purpose. A tendency to make unsupported allegations will only undermine Arab credibility. We all know the story of the boy who falsely cried wolf in order to fool his neighbors. Later when a real wolf attacked, the neighbors refused to go to his aid. If the Arab media want to assert themselves and play their rightful role in the region, their houses will have to be put in order first. The media should also become more professional instead of merely dancing to the tune the public wants to hear. The facts may not be what the public wants to hear.
(Note: Gulf War I — 1980’s war between Iraq and Iran.
Gulf War II — 1991, the liberation of Kuwait.
Gulf War III — 2003 to present.)
— Muhammad Fahd Al-Harithy is a Saudi journalist based in London ([email protected])
