ISLAMABAD, 4 September 2004 — The refrain of his opponents and critics is simple. Imported technocrats don’t make good prime ministers. Pakistan’s central problem is political instability; resolving that problem without civilian politicians is therefore impossible. President Parvez Musharraf has always believed otherwise.
Hence he is now a hopeful man. The one element, he always believed would help him deliver “good governance” in Pakistan, has now been inducted into the prime minister’s slot. Shaukat Aziz, the successful global banker, with his almost 50 minister— Cabinet is now in place.
Gen. Musharraf has steadily “stayed” his own course despite continuing criticism of the ascendancy of uniformed men in the official power structure, of the considerably watered-down role of the Parliament in the semi-democratic dispensation and of the uniformed establishment’s double standards in dealing with politicians.
All this is “tactical adjustment” necessary in the pursuit of the eight-point agenda he articulated in his October 1999, Musharraf argues.
These explanations don’t always wash. While the president may argue that in many critical areas it is “work-in-progress”, in the absence on any substantive results affecting the public, the media and the political class will always criticize the means.
On the home front Musharraf is today in a difficult situation. The laurels he earns externally are not matched domestically. The politics of power-wielding and power containment has overshadowed Musharraf’s effectiveness. He has managed a Pakistan in turbulent times at home and abroad. Externally Pakistan has been right into the eye of a storm on issues that has defined much of the dangerously chaotic international landscape — from terrorism to nuclear proliferation.
Musharraf represents a firm hand, an iron will and an exploring head, with a commitment to Pakistan’s progress and prosperity, yet he remains highly controversial. He is a military ruler. His five years in power have raised many valid questions regarding what he has not achieved from his 7-point agenda of October 1999. It included removing inter-provincial disharmony and restoring national cohesion, ensuring law and order and dispensing speedy justice, depoliticizing state institutions and ensuring swift accountability.
Many questions are raised about the means Musharraf applies in attempting to implement his agenda. What for Musharraf are merely “tactical adjustments” are questionable means for others: Ranging from role and authority-expansion of the army to the elevation of some NAB-listed politicians and selective application of accountability.
The abiding challenge remains of credibly functioning state institutions, an efficiently run administrative structure, channeling economic gains to the economically disadvantaged in society and evolving “rules of the game” in Pakistani politics. Progress on the three critical and related elements from Musharraf’s original 7 points, the depoliticizing state institutions, dispensing speedy justice and accountability has been minimal.
Over the last three years Musharraf’s political agenda has included restructuring the political landscape so that the political space for his key political opponents, the two-time elected Prime Ministers Benazir and Nawaz Sharif, is irreversibly shrunk. Also he has greatly strengthened the presidency by “engineering”, with PML-Q, MMA, MQM and anti-Benazir PPP, the constitutional acceptability of a uniformed president.
At the core of Pakistan’s managerial and political instability lies the issue of unchecked exercise of power. The judiciary must lie at the center of any system that regulates the use of power. It is therefore the most consequential guardian of any system of checks and balances. To however provide an enabling environment, within which the judiciary can indeed play its role as regulator of power, is the task of the Pakistan’s most abiding power center, the COAS. Repeatedly they have deployed the superior courts to justify their unconstitutional interventions.
Significantly now with Shaukat Aziz’s installation as prime minister against the backdrop of a supportive Parliament majority, Musharraf will have the political and legal space to pursue the agenda of establishing a credible judicial system capable of dispensing justice, an honest and competent police system, an independent Election Commission and a non-politicized federal and provincial public service commissions.
For this Musharraf will have to be ready for genuine power sharing.
The Cabinet, a combined choice of Musharraf, the PML president and Shaukat Aziz, will have to function as a unit. If in its functioning its mirrors the Musharraf, Shujaat and Shaukat strands of power, it will merely become a hub of conspiracies and backstabbing.
Only a strict reporting-line for the Cabinet will avoid this. Referees and coaches must direct team members to report only to the team captain!
Also institutionalized coordination will be needed between the three centers of the federal-level power — the president-COAS being the principle center of official power and the prime minister and the PML president the two sub-centers of power. Simultaneously the formation of a high-level political coordination group to proactively deal with important and codependent political issues will be crucial.
In the scheme of Musharraf’s political and state re-engineering, he has now put his ace card in the ring. The million-dollar question is: Will his ace-card perform, will Shaukat Aziz deliver?
— Nasim Zehra is fellow, Harvard University Asia Center, Cambridge Mass.
