ISLAMABAD, 11 September 2004 — This round of public debate on the question of President Parvez Musharraf’s uniform is likely to be a conclusive one. It is quite likely a resolution may be tabled in some provincial assemblies, the National Assembly and even in the Senate in the coming days demanding that the president continue as COAS beyond Dec. 31. The timing of these moves is important on three counts. One, the October retirement of the Vice Chief of Army Staff will require appointment of another Vice Chief only if the president himself chooses to continue as COAS. Two during his late September trip to the US the question of uniform is bound to come up and three, the deadline for fulfilling his December 2003 nationally televised commitment to the nation is fast approaching. Musharraf must believe the matter now requires settlement. His decision on his uniform will be based primarily on the calculations of power politics — not on constitutional or commitment considerations. As a uniformed president, Musharraf has managed to remain in power and to partially re-engineer the political scene and the power structures of Pakistan. Pakistan’s largest vote-bank may still be with Benazir-PPP, yet it now stands divided while the successor party of the PML-N, the establishment-supported PML-Q is under “construction.”

On the uniform question “technically” Musharraf can continue in the slot of the army chief and the president. Although in the post 17-Amendment Constitution, articles 63(1) d and 43(1) provide disqualification and prohibition clauses specifically ruling out a president who is also a paid employee of the state, within the disqualification clause itself lies a simple way out to nullify the prohibition condition. Clause d of article 63(1) clearly states that no “office of profit” can be held “other than an office declared by law not to disqualify its holder.” A simple majority can easily pass such a law in the Parliament.

Meanwhile, many bar councils and other opinion makers opposed to a uniformed president are now more vociferously demanding that he uphold the 1973 Constitution. However it remains unclear how this opinion can be converted into operative pressure.

Short of actually saying that he will not remove his uniform, Gen. Musharraf has been giving reasons why he should be wearing his uniform. In a late 2003 interview he had said, “... under the present circumstances of turmoil in the region, internationally and internally, there is a requirement of stability and unity of command that I am providing.”

In his most recent interview he has maintained that 96 percent of the people of Pakistan do not want him to remove his uniform.

There is also the issue of the president’s own commitment to the nation. In a nationally televised speech after the LFO agreement with the MMA, the president had said, “I have decided that I will remove my uniform by December 2004 and relinquish the office of the COAS...”

Musharraf does face the key test of his credibility, self-confidence and his ability to be the civil-military bridge builder that Pakistan requires for strengthening a sustainable authentic democracy, as he decides what to do about the uniform issue. Doffing his uniform will strengthen Musharraf as the head of the Pakistani state. He will then have demonstrated that transition of power from purely military zones is gradually moving toward the civilian-military zones.

Those who believe that power flows from the barrel of the gun alone are involved in promoting a self-fulfilling prophecy.

As a civilian president, Musharraf will continue to be viewed as a powerful president with 58(2) b and with the army’s support. He will enjoy military support, as the army will view him “their” best choice to deal with local establishment-garnered political groups at home and with key constituencies abroad.

As for the politicians who are advocating he stay on as COAS, they are those who have perpetuated the damaging civil-military divide within Pakistan and have turned democracy into a system of power-grabbing at all costs.

The president, currently struggling to reform state and politics, will have served Pakistan well by breaking this pattern. Musharraf, the maverick on Pakistan’s power scene can break from the destructive old patterns.

— Nasim Zehra is fellow, Harvard University Asia Center, Cambridge Mass.