For almost 50 years, with brief interruptions, civil war has disfigured Sudan and frustrated its economic and political development. In the last hours of the old year, the ink dried on a comprehensive peace agreement between the government in Khartoum and the southern rebels of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. Later this month the final detail of the deal will be agreed.
For most Sudanese, the new year must be dawning with an astonishing sense of unreality. The south of the country is to become autonomous and, at the end of six years, a referendum will decide on secession. If the decision is to stay part of Sudan, both sides will unify their armies into a single military force. The country’s oil wealth is to be shared equally and central and official jobs will be apportioned on fixed ratios. This will ensure that both sides have a proper say in the administration of both the central government and three southern state governments, which have been fought over for half-a-century.
It is too easy to be pessimistic about this groundbreaking agreement. So much blood has flowed and so many terrible things have happened that each side will be viewing the other with the greatest suspicion. Two generations of Sudanese who have known nothing but rebellion and violence can hardly be expected to adjust their hopes and fears overnight. The reasons for optimism, however, are considerable. The fruitless and bitter struggle simply could not continue. The power of the SPLM may have ebbed and flowed over the south of the country but it has long been apparent that the government forces could never completely crush the rebellion, however many victories it might win. Equally, there was no way that the SPLM could defeat the government away from its southern heartland and there was never any question of an SPLM advance northward.
At some point reality had to win. The difficult task has been transforming an acceptance of the inevitable into a viable political and economic peace. The Sudanese government has made significant concessions to the rebels. In doing this, Bashir has had to convince doubters in Khartoum that peace could only come through painful compromise.
The SPLM too has had to give ground, winding back its de facto independence to a limited autonomy, the future of which will be decided by plebiscite in 2011. By then, if the peace has held and each side has learned to trust each other and work together, the Sudanese of the south may prefer to remain part of a newly prospering Sudan than risk the uncertainties and dangers of independence.
The biggest immediate danger is actually that the tragedy in Darfur will divert international attention and sympathy away from the peace deal. Though it has botched its international presentation in this different conflict, the Khartoum government now has an opportunity to leverage its statesmanlike deal with the SPLM to help it find a solution in Darfur.
