In 2004 the many rounds of Pakistan-India dialogue put the two nuclear-armed neighbors back on the normalization path. Simultaneously there was tremendous increase in civilian visitors.
Yet there is hardly any concrete progress on resolving the various bilateral disputes. In fact from September onward the Indian leadership at numerous occasions spelt out India’s bottom-line on Kashmir. That Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of the Indian Union.
Although while pursuing a substantive policy which was perhaps no different from that of Congress administration, India’s BJP Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee had avoided spelling out India’s bottom line so clearly and regularly.
On Siachin too the talks have stalled with India insisting on authentication of Indian troop presence in the Siachin zone. The Siachin is a disputed area requiring a negotiated settlement. Pakistan maintains “authentication” would weaken Pakistan’s negotiating position in the final settlement talks.
On the Baghliar Dam, which India is constructing in violation of the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, repeated rounds of talks in 2004 have not resulted in any settlement. This will again reassert the traditional wisdom in Pakistan that no conflict resolution between Pakistan and India is possible through bilateral negotiations.
A noteworthy illustration of the unproductiveness of Pakistan-India dialogue in trying to resolve disputes is the case of the Jinnah House in Bombay. In 1979 Indian Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao made a commitment to give the Jinnah House, which was then in British possession, to Pakistan. Yet when the British were about to hand over the keys to the Pakistan Embassy the Indian government prevented the handover. Instead the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) directed the British government to hand over the keys of the Jinnah House to the MEA.
India’s position on the Jinnah House conveys the crux of its policy toward Pakistan. That possession not resolutions, agreements and commitments will dictate resolution of disputes. And “possession” India is willing to retain through all means including use of force. In 2004 Pakistan’s response has been continuing engagement, reiterating its own position and also suggesting new ways of approaching the Kashmir dispute.
In such an environment no progress in the military-security area would be likely. India continues to rule out engagement with Pakistan on the Strategic Restraint Regime since India maintains its security parameters extend to China and beyond. Pakistan has its own security concerns vis a vis the conventional and nuclear build-up of a neighbor with which three wars have been fought. Deployment of Indian strike corps along the Pakistan-India border and 600,000 plus Indian security deployment in disputed Jammu and Kashmir heightens Pakistan’s security concerns.
Clearly 2004 has not steered the Pakistan-India dialogue any closer toward dispute resolution. Durable peace between Pakistan and India, in the absence of tangible progress toward dispute resolution, will remain illusive. The only two signs of the likelihood of some positive development taking place are related to Sir Creek and Kashmiri interaction.
Given this negligible progress against the backdrop of multiple level interactions between Pakistan and India, the prognosis for 2005 does not appear to be promising. The framework of strict legality or muscle power are clearly not working. In this relationship of asymmetrical powers, India the more powerful one is unwilling to abide by legality. The smaller power Pakistan is rejecting muscle power as a dispute settler.
The Indian calculation that a friendlier Pakistan-India population will encourage Pakistan to opt for a face-saving solution appears misplaced. In the past despite people-to-people interaction and “external advice”, the disputes between the two have neither “evaporated” nor have they been settled along a zero-sum formula ensuring complete victory or complete defeat for either.
In 2005 India needs to opt for genuine statesmanship over a hegemonic mindset and the Pakistani leadership for more sobriety over verbosity, if any real progress on dispute resolution has to be made. Unless leaderships in both countries recognize that resolutions to bilateral disputes, including Kashmir, will come from the gray zones of accommodation, the road to genuine Pakistan-India cooperation will not be taken.
