The critics of Pakistan’s military engagement in politics want the army back in the barracks. Nevertheless in this period of Pakistan’s ‘strategic course-change’, Pakistan’s army leadership is openly engaged in political affairs on different fronts. Much of the current internal disorder, prompted by a strategic shift in Pakistan’s national security policy revolves around armed and disillusioned groups in confrontation with the state. There is also the political disorder involving mainstream opposition parties.
It therefore logically follows that dealing with these internal sources of security and political disorder must rest on those who exercise maximum control over the affairs of security and politics.
Interestingly, given that the army leadership finds politicians as its partners and beleaguered interlocutors than a group united against its expanded role, the legality of the army’s engagement in national security and politics becomes a peripheral issue. At the center remains the army’s handling of the many existing plus potential flash points.
In the tribal areas the army is engaged through heavy force deployment, proactive political negotiations with the tribes directly and through bipartisan political support from politicians elected from the area. Yet another ‘peace agreement’ between the political negotiations between the army and the local Mehsud tribe is on the anvil. This time they hope that under a six-point agreement Abdullah Mehsud and his aide Baitullah Mehsud would lay down their weapons and the tribe would not give shelter to any Pakistani or foreign suspected militant while providing aid to security officials.
In Balochistan too the army is engaged. Despite its instincts to opt for force-first approach especially when directly attacked, the ruling Muslim League president successfully dissuaded the army leadership from opting for a force-centered approach. In the complex problem of Balochistan, with the danger of growing alienation among sections of the Baloch people, the possibility of a deteriorating security situation and the exploitation by external elements of what appears to be Pakistan’s ‘soft under-belly,’ the army is confronted with the stark reality of the limits of muscle power.
The army is also engaged in managing the relations between the Center and the NWFP and Balochistan provinces where opposition governments are in power. The president, while establishing the constitutionally defined parameters for Center-province relationship, has adopted a proactive role in monitoring and controlling closely the development programs and the ideological reforms that the MMA governments are adopting or planning.
While at the Center the MMA and the army’s political divorce seems to be irreversible, they are collaborating with the MMA in Balochistan.
Led by its chief and also now president with a majority vote of the Parliament, the army has been engaging the opposition leadership. It is now engaged in a sustained dialogue with the PPP leadership on possible areas of political cooperation and convergence. With the PML-N, matters may move beyond indirect dialogue with Shahbaz Sharif. Ultimately to both the PML-N and the PPP, the army will have to concede political space in accordance with their electoral strength.
While the PML president manages the problems within the party and the prime minister administers the federal government, the army chief and his selected team deals with the other coalition partners. The ruling coalition, with the unpredictable MQM and position-seeking coalition partners is fairly ‘high maintenance.’!
Finally in dealing with the political extremism within individuals, political parties and state institutions, the army leadership recognizes that a mere “law and order” approach does not suffice. It understands it requires a political dialogue with those who believe that Pakistan’s policy shifts have amounted to surrender of state to US interest.
Interestingly in most of these situations the army now by virtue of its conciliatory approach on all these issues is beginning to undo the damage of the past. But these are just the initial steps. Ultimately sustained good for Pakistan will flow from a power and governance scene with rule of law and institutionalized decision-making at the heart of Pakistan’s parliamentary democracy. For that the army will have to see itself back into the barracks.
