The guiding principle toward coups d’etat is straightforward: Any attempt to change a government other than through constitutional means is illegitimate. The seizure of power through the use of force is no more to be tolerated than the seizure of territory by the same means.
That is why the seizure of power by a military junta in Mauritania is wholly illegitimate — and indeed has already been condemned by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, by the African Union and the United States. Other governments, other international organizations, will certainly fellow suit.
What happens in Mauritania is of concern here for other reasons too — and not just because President Maaoya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya was attending the funeral of King Fahd when the coup happened. Mauritania is a fellow member of both the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. We cannot remain disinterested in face of political turmoil there, the overthrow of law and order and the likely imposition of international sanctions while the military remain in power. Sanctions seem a certainty. That was seen in the 2002 military coup in the Central African Republic; the country was frozen out of the international community. Likewise, the threat of sanctions was enough to ensure a return to constitutional order in Togo earlier this year following the attempted seizure of power by the late President Eyadema’s son.
But, it may be asked, did not Taya himself originally come to power in a coup, back in 1984? And what about the overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti last year? Does not that count as the seizure of power through the use of force? What about the overthrow of the constitutionally legitimate governments in Georgia two years ago, and more recently in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, Bolivia, Ecuador? What about events in Lebanon? Do they not also count as a form of coup?
In Taya’s case, his coup was 21 years ago, a very different era; coups were recognized then (indeed, they were sometimes instigated by the major powers). But since then Taya has been elected three times. That is the difference. For the rest, there is another important difference — people power rather than military power. In the case of Haiti, Aristide faced a civil war and was persuaded by mediators to leave for the good of the country; there was an armed opposition, but it had massive popular support. In Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, it was just massive people power; arms were not needed. What occurred in all these cases was an expression, albeit crude, of popular will.
To this some might respond that Taya’s policies were unpopular, notably his crackdown on Islamists and Mauritania’s diplomatic ties with Israel, and the Mauritanian Army has acted on behalf of the Mauritanian people. That is a feeble argument; it implies that other Arab governments with diplomatic links to Israel, that have cracked down on Islamists, should face the same fate. But no one, other than militants, would ever think that.
