The six-nation talks on the future of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program resume this week in Beijing. Expressions of “cautious optimism” are coming out of all governments except the one in Pyongyang. The North Korean regime’s silence, however, need not be taken as a bad sign. This is an administration unversed in the arts of political spin doctoring. The Pyongyang delegation will very probably save what it has to say until negotiations restart. It was the Chinese government which brought about the restart of talks. There has been no high-profile shuttle diplomacy between Beijing and Pyongyang — just quiet behind-the-scenes pressure. There was no doubting the Chinese anger when North Korea exploded its first nuclear device, breaking an undertaking not to carry out a test. The Chinese had been busy reassuring Russia, South Korea, Japan and the United States, the other four nations in the talks, that no such provocative test detonations would take place.
China has the ability, by cutting off energy and food supplies to bankrupt and famine-ridden North Korea, to bring the government there to its knees within a few weeks if not in fact days. It is, however, typical of the Chinese diplomatic and strategic long game that no such action was taken. As and when Beijing closes down North Korea, it will be in return for a bigger benefit than international gratitude that a rogue state with a primitive nuclear weapon has been neutralized. Chinese strategists will undoubtedly be looking at Taiwan which causes it as much offense as North Korea causes the Americans. Is there an emerging quid pro quo here — Washington tries to persuade the Taiwanese to accept mainland China’s rule via some Hong Kong-style autonomy — effectively a reunification in return for the reunification of the two Koreas?
Probably North Korea’s leaders have already been offered comfortable retirement in China. But for the moment they are focused on ensuring the political and military survival of their highly regimented Stalinist state. Their massive armed forces and the proven missiles they possess to deliver their rudimentary nuclear warheads are their current first line of defense. However, if China gives an absolute guarantee of North Korean security which is recognized by the other four powers, especially the Americans, Pyongyang might feel able to abandon its nuclear weapons program. A formal treaty to end the 1950-53 Korean War could be coupled with the inflow of aid and funds which has been blocked since the North Koreans made it clear they had gone nuclear.
All of this presupposes that Beijing has persuaded its untrustworthy neighbor to toe the party line. If Pyongyang breaks any new promises it has made in advance of the resumption of talks, it should expect to suffer. The Chinese, however, might not make a public spectacle of any sanctions that it decides to impose. The word is that the North Koreans are ready for compromise and the Chinese should therefore be congratulated.
