Though never mentioned, like the ghost at the banquet, the word “independence” hovered over virtually every line of the proposals for Kosovo’s future, drawn up by UN special envoy, Martti Ahtisaari. It remains to be seen if the UN will accept a plan that will ultimately give Kosovo a great deal more than the autonomy it was supposed to enjoy within the old Yugoslav Federation.

The argument that the formal departure of the last part of the once Serb-dominated Yugoslavia is the final part of a peaceful settlement for the Balkans, is unfortunately dubious. The creation of a European statelet of around 1.5 million ethnic Albanians and 100,000 now-beleaguered Serbs who may emigrate to Serbia is no guarantee of stability. Kosovo is one of the poorest regions in Europe. Clan rivalries locally and with Albanians in Albania itself are likely to challenge the growth of reliable state institutions. Union with Albania would probably create many difficulties, both regionally and within the conjoined territories. If, however, an independent Kosovo becomes an economic basket case — which would seem likely without massive investment — its people will be prey to outside interference, not least from drug barons. Reports already suggest traffickers are trying to use the area as a staging post into the EU.

The Serbian reaction to the Ahtisaari proposals was predictable and demonstrated the fundamental psychological flaw in that country’s thinking. Though some politicians in Belgrade realize it is time to move on, the popular mood is still one of anger and protest because this dirt-poor region was once the heartland of Serbia’s medieval empire, later crushed by Ottoman armies. Thus Serbs once again see themselves as the helpless victims of history. They protest their powerlessness and rue their fate. This negativity feeds the grudges and perceived wrongs by which nationalist-thinking Serbs identify themselves. Yet, a positive approach following enforced withdrawal from Kosovo in 1999 could have had remarkably different results.

What might have happened if, instead of bemoaning their defeats and the injustices they believed lay behind them, the Serbs had sought to deal with ethnic Albanian Kosovars — or indeed any other people who once were in the Yugoslav Federation — in a positive fashion? Suppose they had set out to win hearts and minds, had admitted past errors and started to tell anyone who would listen that they had changed? They could have said that too much blood had been shed, too much destroyed to permit old prejudices and rivalries to continue. Nothing could change the past, but everyone, by working together in partnership, had a very good chance of changing the future.

Unfortunately, with the exception of muted initiatives to Bosnia and Croatia, the Serbs have simply not tried to rebuild bridges. They have not looked forward. They still want to change history. And that is a very dangerous desire.