REPORTS that the bones of an agreement have been agreed by which North Korea will end its nuclear program in return for oil and energy supplies are extremely encouraging — both for peace in the Far East and for what it could mean in relation to the worsening row over Iran’s nuclear intentions. Diplomacy can work.
As far as the North Koreans are concerned, the hope must be that a deal will be reached. The dangers of Pyongyang’s acquiring the capacity to threaten or blackmail its neighbors or, even worse, launch an attack on them are real.
The big question is whether Pyongyang will agree to the deal. Seoul says it will but, having been threatened by its northern neighbor, it desperately wants to believe the reports. The Japanese, on the other hand, are deeply skeptical — and with good reason: North Korea has reneged on such deals before. A very similar one agreed to by the six-nation negotiating teams in September 2005 fell apart because Pyongyang decided it wanted more. It could happen again. Assuming, however, that it does not, there is still an argument that the deal is immoral because the South Koreans, Japanese and Americans, who will have to stump up for North Korea’s energy needs, have given in to Pyongyang’s threats. True, blackmail has paid off — but it is a price worth paying: North Korea with nuclear bombs is too terrible a prospect to contemplate. Moreover, it is in the world’s interest (and should be on its conscience) that the North Koreans do not starve or freeze to death. If this were any other country, energy and funds would have been provided long ago. Better to supply them with the bonus of a nuclear concession in return. It is almost a win-win compromise. The only worry is that blackmailers are never satisfied.
Half a world away, in a Middle East that is deeply worried that the US is heading for a military showdown with Iran over its alleged nuclear plans, the North Korean deal is cause for hope. It shows that the Bush administration can find diplomatic solutions to major problems. It does not always have to reach for the gun.
The big difference, however, is that there is no one to smooth the path to compromise with the Iranians as was so with North Korea. There, China has been both the mediator (but a mediator with a big stick because if it closed the border, the North Korean economy would totally collapse) and Pyongyang’s protector: Washington has steered clear of overt threats for fear of angering Beijing.
In Iran’s case, there is no equivalent of China. A mediator has to be found. It is not a role the OIC can fulfill. It has to be a government which can negotiate with the US, with the EU and with Iran and whose credibility all three believe in and take seriously. Russia is a possibility. So too are one or two or Iran’s Arab neighbors. There is another alternative: India. It has historic links with Iran and it wants to play a greater role on the world stage. Here is its chance. Washington would certainly not ignore its views.
