Perhaps no facet of American politics is more difficult to understand than the role of Congress in foreign policy. Officially, Congress merely supports or opposes policies set by the president by using its constitutional power to provide or deny funding. But in special circumstances, such as when a president’s power is weak or an issue is seen through domestic lenses, Congress plays a more direct role in diplomacy. While the battle over Iraq funding and the recent visit to Syria by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (Democrat-California) have been well documented, another upcoming albeit less publicized fight has the potential to wreak havoc on American foreign policy.
In the coming weeks, the House of Representatives is expected to debate House Resolution 106, a resolution which would officially recognize the Ottoman Empire’s 1915-1923 Armenian policy as genocide. While the measure itself would not change law or alter policy, its passage risks jeopardizing US-Turkish relations. Proponents of the bill are backed by the increasingly powerful Armenian lobby, a coalition of individuals and entities led by the Armenian National Committee of American. The Turkish government, supported by the Bush administration, foreign policy realists, some prominent Jewish legislators, and its $3 million-a-year lobbying operation, has vowed to block the measure. Ankara has also threatened to take punitive measures should Congress pass the bill.
Why the stakes have been raised to such an alarming level over a seemingly innocuous bill baffles many on Capitol Hill. Indeed, since the language of the resolution blames the Ottoman government, not Turkey, for the tragedy which is claimed to have resulted in the deportation or death of up to two million Armenians, the reaction to it seems overblown. Nonetheless, the two powerful coalitions are on a collision course which is destined either to anger a growing domestic lobby or alienate a major ally who plays a critical role in promoting US policy in Europe and the Middle East.
Armenian-Americans — strategically located largely in population clusters in New York, New Jersey, Michigan, and California — did not have a prominent voice in domestic politics until the breakdown of the Soviet Union. At that time, the Armenian population increased, as did Armenia’s importance. Consequently, Armenian leaders in the US organized nationally, and worked with those representing them in Congress to establish an Armenian Caucus, whose primary goals were to declare World War I Ottoman atrocities “genocide” and limit US assistance to Azerbaijan, which at the time was battling Armenia over Nagarno-Karabach. The battles in Congress over these issues created headaches for successive administrations, who needed the support of Turkey and Azerbaijan, respectively, to protect American interests.
Each year, a member of the Armenian Caucus has introduced a non-binding resolution calling on the US to declare the Ottoman-era atrocities a “genocide.” In turn, the White House and Turkey’s allies in Congress would block it. In 2000, however, when Rep. James Rogan (Republican-California), who represented the largest and most politically active Armenian district in the United States, blocked the measure, the Armenian community retaliated by pouring money into the coffers of his Democratic opponent.
When Rogan was defeated by Adam Schiff — who incidentally is the author of this year’s genocide resolution — the Armenian lobby became firmly establish on the domestic political map. While the support of many members is no doubt motivated primarily by the tragic events of the past, one can surmise that support for the genocide resolution was partially shaped by domestic considerations. This helps explain why 170 members of the House have lent their support to the measure this year, and why the newly minted Democratic leadership is loath to upset an important constituency by derailing it.
The Bush administration, joined by foreign policy realists, oppose the measure not necessarily because of what it says or would do, but because Turkey’s potential reaction to it. During a visit to Washington last month, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul stated that his government’s opposition to the bill was a top priority. Gul predicted the bill would “ruin everything” and will have “a great influence” on US-Turkish relations — economically, politically, and militarily. While Armenian proponents scoffed at Gul’s dire warning, there is little dispute that strong relations with Turkey are of great importance. Turkey, after all, is a NATO ally who has repeatedly threatened to invade Northern Iraq to dislodge Kurdish opposition groups.
Turkey is also one of the few Muslim nations with cordial relations with Tel Aviv. This in part explains why Jewish members of Congress are divided over the genocide resolution. Many Jews, with the Holocaust in mind, are instinctively inclined to condemn acts of genocide. But is labeling an act committed over ninety years ago worth risking US-Turkish or Israeli-Turkish relations? Ironically, Rep. Tom Lantos (Democrat-California), the lone Holocaust survivor in Congress and chairman of the House International Relations Committee, is fervently opposed to the resolution. Another prominent foe is Rep. Robert Wexler (Democrat-Florida), the Jewish chairman of the Congressional Caucus on Turkey and Turkish Americans.
Of course, there are many more players involved in the showdown. The Greeks, through the 120-member Congressional Caucus on Hellenic Issues, certainly are watching with great interest. Regardless of the merits, the upcoming debate is instructive in explaining the role of domestic politics on Congress and American foreign policy.
— David Dumke is a political analyst and principal of the MidAmr Group. E-mail: [email protected].
