December 2007 delivered new developments as far as Gulf regional security is concerned. Coinciding with the annual summit meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Doha, Qatar, from Dec. 3 to 4, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was released in the United States, that stated with “high confidence” that Iran had abandoned its military nuclear program as far back as 2003. The news hit like a bombshell leading The New York Times to state that “rarely, if ever, has a single intelligence report so completely, so suddenly, and so surprisingly altered a foreign policy debate.” The suggestion that the threat coming from a potential Iranian nuclear program was far less than originally thought came at the same time that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became the first Iranian president to attend a summit meeting of the Arab Gulf states. Both the release of the NIE in the US and the attendance of President Ahmadinejad in Doha offered opportunities to calm Gulf tensions and downgrade the rhetoric that has been traded between Tehran and Washington.
For Iran, in particular, it was a chance to inject confidence into the relationship with its Arab Gulf neighbors and, in conjunction with the NIE, to allay fears about Iranian intentions that over the past years have led to the distinct possibility of another Gulf conflict.
There are a number of things that need to be put in context as far as the current debate is concerned. For one, a careful reading of the NIE in no way lessens the argument that Iran is in fact conducting a nuclear weapons program. What has been lost in the news coverage is the need to distinguish between the production of nuclear materials (i.e. enrichment), the actual building of a bomb (the program referred to in the NIE as having been stopped) and the necessary delivery mechanisms (for example, the missile program which Iran continues to work on). Iran is thus still pursuing two of the three elements required in the production of a nuclear weapon. In addition, the NIE confirms that Iran was, in fact, pursuing a military nuclear program until 2003, something it has always denied and which stands in clear contrast to continued assertions by Iran that its program is solely for civilian and peaceful purposes. As a result, the Iranian reaction to the NIE release can only be characterized as cherry picking. President Ahmadinejad’s reaction that the NIE report represents the “Iranian people’s victory on the nuclear issue” or the statement by the Iranian justice minister that the NIE should be seen as the “official confession” of the United States completely misrepresent what the NIE says and simply concentrate on a first sentence whose significance has been blown out of proportion. The fact of the matter is that Tehran continues to be in clear violation of two United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR 1737 and 1747) demanding that Iran cease all of its enrichment activities. And it is precisely these activities, which are moving Iran toward a nuclear weapons capability.
The presence of Ahmadinejad at the GCC summit meeting in Doha would have been the right opportunity to address this issue comprehensively as well as other concerns over Iranian regional policy. Yet, once again, his speech to summit delegates failed in meeting such expectation.
No word on the intentions of the Iranian nuclear program and thus no words of assurances for the Arab Gulf leadership, no mention of Iranian policy in Iraq and possibly Iranian efforts to help stabilize the situation there and certainly no word on the issue of the three UAE islands. The Iranian president’s speech was thus only notable for what it did not say.
The ideas that were put forward in terms of a joint economic council, common projects in the oil and gas fields, a free trade zone or the “creation of a collective security arrangement with the GCC and collective security measures” were nothing more than repetitions of past proposals. While collective security measures are fine, what Iran’s President failed to understand is that one needs confidence in the first place to make them work. His continuous reference to the Persian Gulf at a summit of Arab Gulf States was perceived as a particular and unnecessary affront. In contrast to the Iranian president’s performance, the GCC member states showed a certain degree of maturity in their deliberations. As host, Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Hamad Al-Thani, called on both the US and Iran to “reconsider” their positions before it is too late.
Similarly, the Qatari Prime Minister Hamad Bin Jassim made it clear that “all GCC countries have the same opinions about the Iranian threat or the Iranian dialogue.” Equally, the invitation issued by the Qataris to the Iranian president was not without controversy as other GCC delegations were not informed ahead of time. But instead, all delegations agreed that this was in fact an opportunity to hear it straight from the Iranian leadership. Had they known what they would ultimately hear, they might have decided otherwise. Instead, the GCC made it clear that instances like the visit of the Iranian president no longer threatens their sense of purpose.
The NIE might yet turn out to be a blessing in disguise as it could turn the debate over Iran’s nuclear program into a more focused direction and away from hyped-up language suggesting military action. With the prospects of an imminent crisis removed, it will be increasingly difficult for President Ahmadinejad to diverge attention from the actual failings of his administration, specifically in reference to the dismal state of the Iranian economy. Already, former President Rafsanjani has stated that Iran’s current inflation should be dealt with by “with using economic expertise and not with slogans and political games.” Overall, Ahmadinejad’s populism in terms of using crisis to mobilize public opinion around him has worked so far but it is doubtful whether this can continue if the notion begins to spread that it is in fact Iran’s President who is looking for trouble. The focus now will be on the parliamentary elections in Iran scheduled for March 2008. If moderates do well, the internal pressure on Ahmadinejad will likely further increase. The NIE is also important as far as relations between the GCC and the US are concerned. Until now, the confidence within the GCC as to US policy intentions with regard to Iran, or the region as a whole, remains brittle. As expressed by one participant at the Manama Dialogue meeting in early December in Bahrain: “There is a tremendous amount of fear that you (the US) could either end up doing a reckless thing such as a military strike that could set the whole region ablaze, or you could actually sign a deal with Iran that would be at the expense of Arab interests”
At the same meeting, however, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates provided some necessary assurances that this would not be the case when he mentioned that “the United States absolutely does not accept the notion of Iranian hegemony in the region.” His words were perceived as a step in the right direction. More important were Gates’ references to the fact that the “United States seeks to encourage more multilateral ties and cooperation with and among our friends in the region” and that “it is time for the region to be allowed to create its own narrative for the future.” This is an aspect that has been sorely missing from the US approach to the Gulf region so far and one that will be necessary if US-GCC relations are to be put back on track.
The results of the NIE are thus exerting limits on the hawks on both sides. Just as Ahmadinejad has effectively used the fear factor of an imminent US attack to rally Iran’s population behind him, so has the Bush administration used images of a nuclear Iran to impress the need for urgent action on a hesitant US public and on a reluctant Arab Gulf. With the NIE’s conclusion, there is intense pressure on President Bush to stop playing Ahmadinejad’s game and to refrain from delivering the kind of threat language that Iran’s President requires to keep his government in power.
What Washington needs to understand is that the object of US policy pronouncements should be the Iranian public and not Iran’s president because any real change in Iranian policy will only come from within.
Meanwhile, the fact that Iran is not producing nuclear weapons today should not lead to any sort of complacency. The Gulf region cannot wait to the day that it suddenly finds itself confronted by an Iranian nuclear bomb. In this context, all options do in fact remain on the table from a possible US pre-emptive military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, to the GCC obtaining their own nuclear capability or ultimately accepting an American nuclear umbrella. To prevent such eventualities, the NIE offers opportunities to streamline the message to Iran and to show them the open door that can resolve this issue peacefully.
Whether Iran finally makes use of this opportunity will be seen in 2008.
— Christian Koch is director of International Studies at the Gulf Research Center. He can be reached under [email protected]
