As the Sri Lankan military tightens the noose around Tamil Tiger guerrillas, squeezing them into an increasingly tight pocket on the island’s northeast coast, the government appears closer to winning the war than at almost any time since fighting began one-quarter century ago. Yet after the battle ends, it may prove nearly as difficult to win the peace, according to some analysts.
“The risk is that the government will snatch political defeat from the jaws of military victory,” said Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, executive director of the Center for Policy Alternatives, a think-tank in Colombo. “I’m not particularly optimistic.”
A failure by the Sinhalese-majority government in Colombo to extend a hand to its minority Tamil population could spur another guerrilla movement in the Tigers’ place, even if long-time Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader V. Prabhakaran ultimately is captured or killed.
“If the Tamil people don’t get a good political package, if there is triumphalism by the government, another military group with another name will rise up,” said N. Manoharan, senior fellow with the Center for Land Warfare Studies in New Delhi.
The campaign for a Tamil homeland as a refuge from the Sinhalese majority dates back to the 1970s. By the late 1980s, the Tigers had seized control of part of the island’s northeast coast. The group has assassinated several high-ranking Sri Lankan politicians and is credited with pioneering the use of suicide bombings.
Late last year, the army gained the upper hand, and since has reduced Tiger-held territory to fewer than 100 square miles from 7,000 square miles a year ago by expanding its force and adopting more aggressive tactics.
On Thursday, Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake vowed that the Sri Lankan military would continue to attack remaining guerrilla strongholds, despite calls by the US and other powers for a cease-fire to allow safe passage for an estimated one-quarter million trapped civilians.
Wickremanayake said the army’s assault was a “humanitarian operation” because it offered the prospect of ending terrorism in Sri Lanka and freed the minority Tamil population from Tiger rule.
Humanitarian groups have a different view. “International humanitarian law sets out rules that have to be followed in conflict situations,” said Sophie Romanens, a spokeswoman in Colombo with the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Red Cross last week helped move 300 patients out of the last functioning hospital in the shrinking war zone after it was shelled repeatedly. At least 52 civilians were killed according to the UN, which has maintained a small humanitarian presence. The military released its own figures, saying 1,180 civilians crossed over to government-controlled land on Wednesday and Thursday and another 600 on Friday. The origin of the cluster bombs fired on the hospital in Puthukkudiyiruppu is a matter of dispute, although some people believe it probably came from government forces.
Patients are camped in a community center in Puttumatalan, about four miles away. “If you are in critical condition, any distance is a long way,” Romanens said. “Many patients are outside. They have had to hang IV drips from the trees.”
The conflict has implications beyond Sri Lanka’s borders. For the West, a defeat of the Tigers would eliminate a global hotspot at a time when military and intelligence resources are stretched. It also potentially could end the activities of a group reportedly involved in credit card fraud, money laundering, organized crime, weapons proliferation, recruitment of child soldiers, ocean-borne piracy and drug trafficking to further their operation. The US designated the LTTE a terrorist organization in 1997.
Regionally, China and Pakistan are maneuvering to strengthen their ties with Sri Lanka, which India has long considered part of its sphere of influence.
China sees Sri Lanka as a key link in its “string-of-pearls strategy” of maintaining strong relations with nations along its vital energy supply route from the Middle East, Manoharan said. And Pakistan has an interest in building ties with nations on India’s periphery to counter its giant adversary, an objective China shares.
India itself also is walking a balancing act at home. It supports an end to the long-running conflict on its doorstep — which has resulted in an estimated 70,000 deaths in 25 years. And it has strengthened its support for Sri Lanka after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by a Tamil Tiger suicide bomber in 1991.
But India also is wary of offending its own sizable Tamil population, particularly now when the government is depending on support from the government of Tamil-dominated Tamil Nadu in the upcoming election in April. Protests against the war and the Sri Lankan government have been staged across the southern state following the self-immolation of a Tamil protester on Jan. 29.
The government’s best hope of winning the peace is to engineer a political settlement that brings Sri Lanka’s disaffected Tamils back into the fold and gives them a share of power, analysts said.
Colombo has floated a “Four Ds” plan — demilitarization, democratization, development and devolution — to achieve postwar reconciliation. But the temptation may be too great to lord it over the vanquished, given President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s record of siding with the Sinhalese majority at the expense of the Tamils, some said.
Another concern is what happens to the nation’s 200,000 soldiers — a four-fold increase since 2000 — once the fighting ends. The island’s economy is not in a position to absorb so many young men easily, potentially creating a destabilizing political force.
The military prospects for the Tigers remain bleak, despite their history of defying long odds. “They are quite desperate guys,” said retired Col. R. Hariharan, who headed India’s intelligence operation during the late 1980s when Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) were deployed in Sri Lanka. “They have very little place to go.”
The pocket of land where they are trapped, as small as 30 square miles by some accounts, is sandy with limited vegetation and few places to hide. They also have lost much of their artillery in the fight, leaving them largely dependent on 81mm mortars that limit them to opportunity targets.
The Tigers procure most of their weapons through arms dealers reportedly from Cambodia, Ukraine, Thailand and Myanmar and elsewhere. An FBI sting in 2006 led to the arrest of four men trying to procure anti-aircraft missiles, grenade launchers and AK-47 assault rifles on behalf of the Tigers, all of whom were convicted last month and await sentencing. A separate sting unearthed an attempt to bribe US State Department officials to have the Tigers removed from the US terrorist list.
