THE US and its NATO allies are desperately looking for a big military victory against the Taleban to prepare the path for a possible political settlement later on. They have chosen Marjah, a small town in Helmand province, as a target and they made no secret of their intentions. The fight for Marjah will signify a turning point in the long and frustrating war against the Taleban, or so hope the top military brass and the politicians behind them.

Since President Barack Obama ordered 30,000 more troops to be shipped to Afghanistan late last year, the surge has become the focal point of Washington’s new strategy to secure victory in that country. Now that strategy is going to face its first real test. It’s winter, the enemy is fully prepared, ISAF and the Afghan army know their objective, civilians have been warned to leave the theater of operation and a fierce battle is about to take place in a barren and hostile plain.

Winning in Marjah will pave the way to retaking Helmand, a rebellious province that had withstood similar assaults in the past. But this time the Americans, headed by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, have a different game plan. Unlike in previous campaigns in Helmand, the allies want to defeat the Taleban, drive them away and bring in the Afghan government so that it can protect the civilian population, destroy narco-trafficking and offer a better alternative. As McChrystal put it recently he wants this to be a fully integrated civilian/military effort. Winning in Helmand, this time, will be different. It will send a positive message to the people of Afghanistan, as well as to the Taleban leadership.

While preparing for this hybrid military campaign, involving thousands of NATO and Afghan troops, the problem of Afghanistan has been receiving unusual attention in political meetings around the world, ranging from a special conference in London, to a NATO defense ministers summit in Istanbul, to another strategic conference in Munich. Before that Afghan President Hamid Karzai called on King Abdullah to ask for a resumption of Saudi mediation efforts with the Taleban. Riyadh had hosted talks in 2008 but to no avail.

KARZAI has been promoting a plan to negotiate with Taleban leaders while offering their followers economic incentives. The Americans are reluctant to talk with senior Taleban at this stage, but prefer to drive a wedge between the leaders and common people by pouring money into deprived regions and strongholds. It is in Marjah and the rest of Helmand that they hope to implement such scheme.

But McChrystal’s plan is not fool proof. Not everyone in Washington embraces it. There are those who believe that McChrystal’s reading of the situation on the ground is too optimistic. They point to the fact that Afghan-Pakistan borders remain porous, allowing Taleban fighters to withdraw, regroup, seek refuge and supplies. Others say that the insurgents will not necessarily play by the general’s rules and that they could choose to simply withdraw to their secluded mountain lairs and wait this one out.

This is probably why NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen is seeking “a stronger, (and a) more inclusive security coalition” that includes countries like India, China and Russia to join the fight. Worn-out NATO members have no stomach for a long campaign that promises more casualties and further commitment.

SPEAKING at the Munich Security Conference, Rasmussen said that a key lesson of the alliance’s woes in Afghanistan was that NATO “needs an entirely new compact between all the actors on the security stage.”

He is right of course because failure in Afghanistan will eventually affect the security interests of India, China and Russia.

A Taleban victory will spell trouble for Pakistan and will eventually threaten the stability of the entire Indian subcontinent, Central Asia and the Gulf.

It is far-fetched that victory in Helmand will usher in the beginning of the end of an eight-year war in Afghanistan that has so far strained NATO resources, frustrated international efforts and kept a corrupt and unpopular government in power.

A political settlement will eventually be sought to try to bring about peace to that country. But in spite of Karzai’s initiative, the Taleban leaders are not relenting. Their conditions are impossible to meet; calling for foreign troop withdrawal before talks can begin.

Karzai may be over-reaching. He might not even be the right man to make credible gestures. But the people of Afghanistan are tired.

Their support for the Taleban is waning and may be driven by fear more than solid commitment. A bungled military campaign in Helmand could bring undesired effects, both locally and internationally.

Winning the war in Afghanistan was supposed to take a different path altogether. Getting rid of the Taleban was to be followed by sincere and transparent efforts to rebuild that country and guide it toward prosperity and development. Eight years later the picture remains somber and bleak for millions of Afghanis. Eight years later the West is yet to win the hearts and minds of the people of that country.

— Osama Al Sharif is a veteran journalist and political commentator based in Jordan.