As the Kabylie continues to boil, a question is posed by some analysts of the Algerian tragedy: Is this the start of the mass uprising that everyone has predicted for the past decade or so — a rising likely to sweep away the old order along with the small elite of “decision-makers” that have dominated Algerian politics since independence?
The short answer is a simple “no”.
Despite sensational headlines by the French media in recent days, the troubles in the Kabylie are unlikely to trigger a nationwide revolt based on “people’s power”. The Algerian pressure cooker is likely to continue boiling and hissing for some time yet before the feared explosion becomes possible.
There are several reasons for this. The first is that the troubles in the Kabylie appear to be a result of sinister moves by certain circles in and around the power elite who want to destabilize, and if possible, overthrow President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. These circles are using the genuine grievances of the Kabylie, some 20 percent of the population, as a pretext for an assault on the president. In this, they are aided by the fact that the Kabylie leadership is divided and incapable of providing a serious program. One leader, Hocine Ait-Ahmad, prefers to follow events from his retreat in Geneva while the other, Said Sadi, has become a prisoner of the governing coalition.
Yet another reason is that a good many of the key figures in the ruling structures are themselves Kabylie. According to some estimates, Kabylie represent almost 60 percent of the senior officers in the Algerian Army and security apparatus. In some sectors of the administration, the Kabylie presence in key positions represents almost 80 percent. Thus, the idea that the Kabylie are an oppressed minority with no access to political power is hard to sustain. What is certain is that the Kabylie have legitimate cultural, linguistic and political grievances that have not been addressed by successive governments in Algiers.
That does not mean that the four provinces where the Kabylie are in a majority or heavily present are in a “colonial” position as some French commentators claim.
Still another reason why the current revolt is unlikely to develop into a revolution is that its organizers have offered no coherent message likely to mobilize the masses from Constantine to Oran. The slogans “No gendarmes in Kabylie” and “Ruling Assassins” are negative leitmotivs that cannot go very far. And no popular revolution succeeds without a positive message, a slogan that creates hopes of a better tomorrow.
The Kabylie demonstrators and their leaders have made yet another major mistake. They have chanted slogans in favor of Hassan Hattab, one of the most vicious of fundamentalist terrorists who has failed to find a support base among the Kabylie. The demonstrators have shouted Hattab’s name not because they support him but as a means of inciting hatred against the president and his government.
Some commentators believe that street politics of the kind seen in the Kabylie these days may well provide an alternative to both the frozen politics of the institutions and the deadly politics of terrorism. Street politics, however, can never tackle the complex and dangerous problems that Algeria faces. Street politics could only aggravate the culture of violence that has seized control of Algeria since the late 1980s.
Algeria’s best bet would be to try and tackle its problems through its newly created institutions. Despite its obvious imperfections, the Algerian Parliament is a reasonably representative body by the standards of the so-called developing world. It may be argued that the sitting parliament has lost its edge. In that case, the president should dissolve the National Assembly and organize fresh elections, thus allowing all groups and parties to express their desires, and vent their anger, through normal electoral politics rather than street violence and counterviolence.
The big question mark in all this is whether or not Bouteflika has the temperament and the experience to handle the intricate transition that Algeria is experiencing from a one-party system to a pluralist democracy. Bouteflika’s critics say he has no experience of pluralist politics because he served as foreign minister in a regime centered around a single decision-maker.
They also point to Bouteflika’s bizarre love of foreign travel. Senior Cabinet ministers tell us in private that major decisions are constantly postponed because the president is either abroad or too tired to sit in at lengthy sessions needed to examine policy.
Can Algeria’s new institutions, fragile though they are, withstand the latest challenge from the Kabylie events? There is no reason why they should not. What is needed is for the Kabylie leaders especially Ait-Ahmad and Sadi to get their acts together and channel the anger of the streets into institutional political directions.
Taking Algerian politics into the streets can only strengthen the position of those who believe that only the army can rule the troubled North African nation. Street politics is always intimately linked to the politics of military coup d’état.
Bouteflika is certainly not the ideal leader that Algeria needs at this time. His one-party culture, his dislike of hard and systematic work and his excessive belief in his own genius are serious handicaps. But the fact remains that he happens to be the man in charge and, as such, must be allowed to lead, and to submit himself to the judgment of the people in just over two years’ time.
Bouteflika may be wasting Algeria’s time as some critics claim. But removing him either through street violence or behind-the-scenes intrigues could do even greater harm to Algeria’s democratic prospects. Street politics in Algeria is as much of a dead-end as is the politics of terrorism. Now that Algeria has taken the path of pluralism it must stick to the rules of the game.
It must also learn the virtues of patience when it comes to developing institutions that may take generations to attain their cruising speed. The troubles in Kabylie must be taken as a warning that Algeria needs effective leadership and speedy decision-making and not as a pretext for another military coup.
