Seismologists have established the fact that a devastating earthquake, measuring anywhere between six and seven on the Richter scale, would generate aftershocks of lesser reading and effect.
The incident involving the American spy plane, that made an emergency landing at a Chinese military base after colliding with a Chinese fighter plane, qualifies to be described as an earthquake measuring 10 on the Richter scale. It devastated the American military establishment while confirming the soundness and strength of the Chinese position. China is now looking forward to becoming the No. 2 superpower in the world after successfully managing the crisis.
As I said in an earlier article titled “Apology or no apology, China has won the war” which appeared in this column on April 9, the first phase of the latest Sino-American crisis ended in a diplomatic agreement that was more a face-saving one than a solution to the problem. The crew of the spy plane returned home because the incident was not serious enough to trigger a military confrontation between Washington and Beijing or ruin their highly complicated bilateral relations.
China was able to access a treasure of secrets containing the state-of-the-art American espionage technology. It was able to do this without difficulty. This was evident from the crew’s statement after the incident. They admitted that they were unable to destroy all sensitive material onboard the plane.
Following the return home of the crew and Washington’s diplomatic apology over the incident, the aftershocks of the devastating earthquake have begun rocking the Sino-American relations anew. The first shock, originating from Americans, was the announcement by President George Bush that his administration was committed to the defense of Taiwan (considered by China as a renegade island) and the protection of the island’s independence. Bush then approved the sale of advanced American weapons to Taiwan in a deal that was the largest of its kind in the last ten years.
Bush’s stand was a departure from positions adopted by previous American administrations, which avoided direct talk on an American military response if Taiwan came under a Chinese attack in order not to antagonize Beijing.
Such threats, in reality, were never serious. Firstly, because Washington would not gamble militarily to defend Taiwan, for in that event, it must use its bases in Japan. This would prove a bit of a bother, as Japan would not readily agree to be used as the launching base, by the American forces, to attack China. Secondly, the memory of Vietnam is still vivid in the American psyche. It was a very difficult experience for the Americans. And these two reasons would leave Bush in a spot. He will not be able to honor such a commitment if a Chinese invasion of Taiwan takes place. Bush’s statement was thus no more than a reaction to the embarrassment that Washington was exposed to.
The arms deal, too, is no more than a provocative move against the Chinese leadership. It was, simultaneously, meant to reward the lobby of the American arms industry, which helped, bring Bush to the White House. No matter how big the deal, it will not help achieve any tilt in military power in the Straits of Taiwan against the Chinese giant.
The aftershocks originating from China came in the form of a direct warning by the Chinese military command to Washington against going ahead with the arms deal to Taiwan.
China then refused to allow the spy plane from flying out of the country, arguing that such a move will anger the Chinese people although it allowed American technicians to examine the plane to determine whether it could be repaired and flown home.
Beijing hinted at the possibility of dismantling the plane and shipping it in crates onboard an American ship, a suggestion that only angered the Americans.
Judging the pluses and minuses in the ongoing incident, we find that China was able to manage the crisis in a strikingly efficient manner that gave it success in the first phase of the crisis. It knew how to monopolize the moment at a time when it was facing a dire need of reshaping its relations with the new American administration for a number of reasons:
Firstly: The Bush administration had not yet defined the main course of action in its policy toward Beijing.
Secondly: The crisis had come at a time when China was trying to convince the new administration not to respond to calls demanding the supply of advanced military hardware to Taiwan.
Thirdly: The crisis coincided with American attempts to convince the United Nations Human Rights Commission to condemn China’s human rights record.
Fourthly: The crisis had come at a time when China was willing to convince Washington to drop some of its conditions that were delaying China’s access to the World Trade Organization.
These were the aftershocks of the big earthquake caused by the crisis over the spy plane. But after assessing the pluses and minuses in the incident, we believe China is on its way to consolidate its gains in a manner that reflects a farsightedness and strategic insight that will further contain American hegemony and put more pressure on Washington while it tries to revive the strategic defense project. Very soon all this will become clear.
