For the first time in almost a year the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians did not make the front pages of major American newspapers Friday. And yet it is now that diplomatic efforts to end the tension appear to be gathering momentum.
The United Nations Security Council is scheduled to hold a special session on the conflict on Monday. The Palestinians want the council to create some mechanism for observing and monitoring the cease-fire accords negotiated by the CIA director, George Tenet. Israel is opposed to this, although Shimon Peres has just made remarks that indicate a more flexible approach.
At first, trying to steer clear of what looked like a non-win situation, the Bush administration is becoming increasingly active. One reason is that it realizes that Israel, under Ariel Sharon, appears to have run out of ideas as to how to handle the deteriorating situation. According to Washington sources, Sharon’s last “big” idea, the reoccupation of the West Bank, was vetoed by Bush in a telephone conversation Thursday.
So what are the ideas now making the rounds in think tanks and diplomatic circles?Leaving aside those who think that it is better to allow the current round of violence to go full circle, analysts focus on five possible options all of which would lead to some form of “separation” between Israel and the Palestinians.
The first option is known as “doing an East Timor”. This refers to Indonesia’s decision two years ago to withdraw its troops from East Timor thus washing its hands of a 25-year conflict. The idea has supporters both in Israel and the United States. One key advocate of this option is former Israeli Premier Ehud Barak. Their argument is that no matter how many agreements are made with any Palestinian leadership there will always be some Palestinians who would wish to continue waging war against Israel because of its very existence. Israel should, therefore, shorten its logistic lines, reduce its points of exposure to violence and mobilize its forces for protecting defensible boundaries.
Opponents of this option argue that it would plunge the occupied territories into chaos. War could break out among rival Palestinians factions, many of them heavily armed, for control of territory and position. That could produce a stream of refugees fleeing not only to Jordan but also to Israel itself.
The second option is for Israel to hand the West Bank and Gaza to Jordan and Egypt. After all, these territories were under Jordanian and Egyptian control when Israel conquered them in 1967. Supporters of the idea claim that Jordan and Egypt would be better able to establish peace and security in the “ released” lands during a transition period and until the creation of a Palestinian state. Since Jordan and Egypt have a peace treaty with Israel they would be obliged to make sure that the “released” territories are not used for attacks on the Jewish state.
Opponents of the idea say it is doubtful that Jordan and Egypt would be prepared to play such roles, even under strong pressure from Washington. They have no interest in acting as occupiers in a dangerous region and become Israel’s policemen.
The third option is for Israel to ask for a special session of the Security Council where it would announce its withdrawal from 97 percent of the occupied territories and, in effect, leave the keys for the rest with the UN. Among supporters of this idea is former Israeli Justice Minister Josi Beilin. Supporters of this option claim that it would enable a smooth transition from Israeli occupation to Palestinian statehood under a brief UN mandate.
Opponents of the idea say it is unlikely to be acceptable to the Palestinians who could immediately declare a state and be sure of recognition by a majority of UN members. In the confusion that could ensue, Israel could become involved in a war with the new Palestinian state.
The fourth option is for the Palestinians to declare a state, win recognition from Israel and the UN, and allow Israel to withdraw from almost all the occupied territories. What would then remain would be the Israeli settlements on Palestinian land, which account for less than two percent of the total. That issue plus others such as the exact borders of the two states, and an exchange of land to enable the Palestinian state to be contiguous, could be the subject of future negotiations leading to a formal peace treaty between the two neighbors. Supporters of that option assert that the very emergence of a Palestinian state could create a feel-good factor that could facilitate subsequent deals about complex issues such as borders and the sharing of Jerusalem.
Opponents of the option say all it does is postpone the hard issues and thus keep fear and violence simmering under the surface for the foreseeable future.
The fifth option is for President George W. Bush to ask both Israel and the Palestinian Authority to announce a period of pause during which they would present him with their respective negotiating positions in the form of a brief written statement. The two sides would then announce a fixed period for negotiations and at least a notional date for the start of full Israeli withdrawal. Supporters of the idea argue that its implementation would move the conflict back to the diplomatic arena and thus impose a measure of restraint on both sides. The fact that a notional timetable is fixed in advance both for the completion of talks and the start of Israeli withdrawal would go along way to calm Palestinian anger without giving Israeli hawk an excuse to sabotage an eventual peace deal.
Opponents of the idea say direct involvement by the US would, as in the past, generate unreasonable expectations on both sides that could actually hamper a deal.
Most analysts agree on three points. The first is that the Sharon Plan, under which Israel agrees to hand over 42 percent of the occupied territories to the Palestinian Authority, is a nonstarter.
The second point is that Arafat will not be able to play on several chessboards at the same time and would have to come up with a clear position stating his maximum demands.
The third point is that the best option for peace in the region is a negotiated settlement not a unilateral Israeli withdrawal or reoccupation of the areas now under Palestinian Authority control.
An Israeli unilateral withdrawal could reproduce the “ South Lebanon syndrome” on a much larger scale. The most radical Palestinian elements would feel that they had defeated Israel and forced it out. This would inevitably produce a momentum for intensifying the struggle against Israel until it is driven out of the “whole of Palestine”.
