For the US-led assault on Afghanistan, the moment of truth appears to have come. The US has been bombarding one of the world’s most technologically backward countries with the world’s most technologically sophisticated weaponry. But now the scenario is to change — it is to be soldier against soldier. As the US found out to its terrible cost in Vietnam, all the advanced weaponry and air support that human ingenuity could devise was not able to remove the need for highly motivated and determined soldiery. The North Vietnamese proved to have the stronger will and, with their relatively primitive armament, inflicted on America a traumatic defeat.
Since Vietnam, America’s reluctance to take military casualties has been clear. But the profound shock of the horrors of Sept. 11 appears to have swept such fears aside. But it may take more than this massive outburst of public rage to make this new acceptance of the brutal realities of conflict stick. A procession of body bags might still corrode US determination.
It is interesting that a recent report from the Pentagon cast doubt on the fighting ability of large parts of the US armed forces. It was critical of personnel who enlisted merely to have a secure, well-paid career, who regarded the risks involved in actually fighting one day with abhorrence. And most US top brass privately believes that female combatants are undermining military effectiveness. It may be that at least in their special forces, the Americans have really tough troops. But they are up against opponents for many of whom warfare is a way of life. Whatever troops are put on the ground by the US and its allies, they will not find themselves up against panicky and demoralized conscripts, such as the Iraqi troops through which the coalition forces cut a swathe ten years ago. The Pentagon appears to acknowledge this implicitly when it refers to “hit and run” raids. This sounds odd from a country that prides itself on its big hitting, and doesn’t like to talk about running. But, of course, this is the only way that special forces can work.
The real test is likely to come as and when large troop formations are sent in by Washington. In Afghanistan, the challenging mountainous terrain favors the small mobile, self-sufficient units which can monitor closely opponents in the towns below. As the Soviet invaders and the British before them discovered, control of the towns is a weakness in an Afghan war.
But it may never come to the use of large formations. The Taleban are not Washington’s real target. Behind the explosions and propaganda, the US will have been mounting an intensive intelligence operation to pinpoint Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. What the US planners must be hoping is that they will be able to launch a devastating strike against these, and obtain conclusive proof that Bin Laden and as many as possible of his henchmen are slain.
Their problem is that Bin Laden and his Taleban supporters probably realized this from the start. The Al-Qaeda leadership will have been dispersed and Bin Laden himself will be so heavily protected that it will take very special special forces to kill or capture him and along the way, some, perhaps a lot, of these prime US, and maybe British, Australian, French and German, special troops will not survive.
